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ABSTRACT 
 
The economic policy of the South African government referred to as the Growth Employment 
and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) has had a crippling impact on millions of poor and low-
income families in South Africa since its adoption in 1996. The benefits to the minority have 
not compensated for the increased inequality, uncertainty and poverty that others have 
experienced (McDonald & Pape, 2002:24). 
 
South Africa became the first African state to develop and implement a structural adjustment 
programme by voluntarily seeking the assistance of the World Bank and the IMF (Bond, 
2000a:35). The government’s own statistics reveal that unemployment, which was already 
high, reached catastrophic levels since 1996 and the poor became significantly poorer 
(Beuchler, 2002:04).  Together with their community leadership, poor people increasingly 
managed to articulate the link between the increased poverty and hardships they experience 
and the state’s macro-economic policies.  
 
More than a decade into democracy, Mandela Park finds itself under armed assault by the 
State. Several community members have sacrificed their lives while fighting revolutionary 
struggles to ensure access to basic services and to remain in the places apartheid confined 
them.  None of them ever thought that the hopes and dreams they harboured while fighting for 
democracy would be so brutally suppressed by the very government for which they sacrificed 
their lives. 
 
Community organizations such as the Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign (MPAEC) make 
significant contributions to community empowerment by mobilizing and articulating the 
voices of the poor and the vulnerable groups in the society to resist the State’s hegemony with 
regards to service cut-offs and household evictions. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Die ekonomiese beleid van die Suid Afrikaanse regering wat bekend staan as GEAR het n 
kreupelende uitwerking op miljoene arme en lae-inkomste gesinne in Suid Afrika gehad veral 
sedert die program in 1996 deur die regering aanvaar is.  Die voordele aan ‘n enkele  
minderheid  het nie vergoed vir die toenemde ongelykhede, onsekerhede en armoede wat 
andere ondervind het nie  (McDonald & Pape, 2002:24). 
Suid Afrika het die eerste Afrika staat geword om n strukturele aanpassingsprogram te 
ontwikkel en te implementeer deur vrywilliglik die hulp van die Wêreld Bank en die 
Internasionale Monitêre Fonds te soek (Bond, 2000a:35).  
 
Soos die regering se eie statistieke aandui, het werkloosheid wat alreeds hoog is, katastrofiese 
vlakke bereik terwyl die land se armes merkwaardig armer geword het (Beuchler, 
2002:04).Arm mense het tesame met hul gemeenskapleiers toenemend daarin geslaag om die 
verband tussen hul groeinde armoede en swaarhede, en die regering se makro-ekonomiese 
beleid te identifiseer.  
 
Nou, na meer as ‘n dekade in demokrasie, bevind Mandela Park inwoners hulself onder 
gewapende aanval deur die staat.  Gemeenskapslede het revolusionêre gevegte gestry en hul 
lewens op die spel geplaas om toegang tot basiese dienste te verseker en te bly in die plekke 
waar apartheid hulle gevestig het. Niemand het ooit kon dink dat die hoop en drome wat hulle 
gekoester het terwyl hulle teen apartheid geveg het, so wreed onderdruk sou word deur 
dieselde regering waarvoor hulle hul lewens opgeoffer het nie.  
 
Gemeenskapsorganisasies soos die MPAEC in Mandela Park het ‘n betekenisvolle bydrae 
gemaak tot die bemagtiging van daardie gemeenskap  deur die mobilisasie en artikulasie van 
die stemme van die arm en kwesbare groepe in die samelewing om weerstand te bied teen die 
Staat se hegemonie ten opsigte van die beeindiging van dienste en die uitsetting van gesinne 
uit hul huise. 
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CHAPTER 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1  Background and Introduction 
The commodification of the necessities of life has resulted in rebellions around South Africa 
but very limited note was taken of these community struggles in the media and academic 
circles. The ‘community struggles’, as they have been labelled, were chiefly aimed against 
government’s policy on cost recovery and service cut-offs (Mc Donald & Smith, 2002:12). It 
is disturbing to learn about the limited attention given to these struggles in academic or media 
circles and in cases where attempts were made to write about them, the works of such authors 
rather tend to romanticize them. One cannot help being moved by the bravery of a teenage 
boy who sacrificed his life to ensure that a neighbour did not endure a winter without 
electricity, or by a courageous woman who stared down armed law enforcement agents to 
ensure that no old lady is evicted from her house. It is about affirming humanity’s 
unconditional right to services and the means to life (2002:13). In a neo-liberal context 
however, this is far-fetched, this is taboo. 
 
The community rebellions are basically aimed at blocking and reversing dispossession, 
confronting household evictions as well as water and electricity cut-offs (Harvey, 2001:29). 
These are largely reactive and defensive struggles. Mostly, they revolve around singular 
issues and are periodic mobilizations that are not of ongoing nature and do not lead to 
sustained confrontation of the neo-liberal policies of the State (Bond, 2000a:35). Some 
authors are concerned that the Mandela Park contestation could turn into a showcase of 
‘isolated militancy’ suffocated by sustained repression, against the background of an African 
National Congress (ANC) endorsed, well-networked and well-funded South African National 
Civic Organisation (SANCO) as being the sole organisation able to represent community 
concerns ‘legitimately’ (Rostron, 2002:8). 
 
The severe scarcity of resources including the ability of the ANC to make strategic 
concessions and to enforce repression, feed into the difficulty of sustaining mass action. 
Because the activities are confrontational in nature (that is, against the police and law 
enforcement agencies), lengthy court battles are inevitable and have depleted available 
resources so quickly that it became impossible to identify with similar struggles around the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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country or abroad. In fact, Mandela Park activists often find it difficult to work with their 
counterparts, even around Khayelitsha because of lack of funds for transportation and 
telephones.  
 
Additionally, there have been limited and fragmented attempts to mobilize communities over 
issues such as family violence, crime and the generation of collective livelihoods. These show 
that current struggles are focusing on other issues beyond the mere struggle for survival.                
 
In an  attempt to reach beyond defensive reactive rebellions, the Mandela Park Anti- Eviction 
Campaign (MPAEC) recently took a bold initiative by opening a community run school 
(Pillay & Pithouse, 2003:32).  This happened after the MPAEC seized an old school building, 
enrolled 1800 new pupils within the first year of operation and recruited 28 teachers who 
were previously unemployed to start teaching. The pupils consisted mainly of those who were 
refused enrolment at other schools for reasons relating to age, examination failure or fees. The 
Western Cape Department of Education initially agreed to allow the school to operate but 
later closed it down (2003:32).  
 
Like most community movements, MPAEC members are very cautious of identifying 
themselves as a formal organisation that has links with organised national structures.  This is 
in part due to the fact that radical civic leaders are co-opted, leading to a general belief among 
community movements that formalization promotes internal oligarchies that usually blunt 
'militancy', which is the main source of movement influence (Eckstein, 2001:7). As a result, 
community movements opted for the strategy called 'disruption'. 
 
Community movements believe that formalization is detrimental to the ability of subordinate 
groups to effect societal change and that the poor can institute change through 'disruption', 
which can be achieved without formalization (Pivan & Cloward, 1979:29). Barchiesi 
(2001:10) argues that it is the unpredictable and informal character of these movements that 
provide them with power. Some authors are of the opinion that community movements should 
amalgamate into one new working class movement that would be an alternative to the ANC, 
especially on its own home turf, namely the poor black majority (Pillay & Pithouse, 2003:38). 
Others argue that community movements must remain independent but should form strategic 
partnerships on important occasions such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
and the World Conference against Racism (Bond, 2000a:34). Many others expect that the 
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well-oiled machinery of the labour movement, in collaboration with community movements, 
should challenge the neo-liberal policies of the ANC government.  
 
It is the renewed entrenchment of working class poverty under an ANC government that made 
poor people realise that access to electricity, housing and water, which are unaffordable at 
market prices and are increasingly privatised, cannot be acquired under conditions of low and 
irregular wages. Furthermore, the success of the ANC government in responding to the 
militancy of community movements has sparked off new spheres of contestations, explosive 
demands and solidarity among the oppressed (Rostron, 2002:08). The leadership of the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) has been co-opted by the post-apartheid 
government and their corresponding soft approach to the bullying neo-liberals has reinforced 
the need for community movements to 'go it alone.' These sentiments have caused activists 
and community members to write-off unions and to put their faith completely in the 
community movements.   
 
It should be noted that every meeting in Mandela Park focuses on 'betrayal'.  The grievance is 
that the mass mobilization of the 1980s and the struggle against apartheid have been seriously 
betrayed and undermined by the ANC. Most speeches focus on how particular groups and 
individuals have hijacked the struggles of the people. The community movements are 
described as the true representatives of the liberation that can never be defeated. It is because 
of this ability to maintain the commitment of followers and activists that these community 
movements succeed in overcoming setbacks (Sekyi-Out, 1996:03). The current repression 
provides fertile ground for myths that sustain and inspire rebellion. At Mandela Park, 
vigorous debates are taking place about several issues such as forming a united front against 
the ANC, the nature of leadership and the form of organisation. Despite all these things, 
community movements have won a good number of defensive battles and have thus frustrated 
the State’s efforts to impose neo-liberalism and cost-recovery.   
  
Khayelitsha has a rich history of the struggles against apartheid. The township has named its 
roads in honour of liberation heroes such as Govan Mbeki, Steve Biko, and Albertina Sisulu 
and, in Mandela Park, Chris Hani and Braam Fischer. As this researcher drove down Chris 
Hani Road on 26 November 2006 to honour an appointment with one of the activists, a group 
of about a hundred people, mostly women, gathered on one street corner, calling for Max 
Ntanyana’s release from Pollsmoor Prison. The small crowd sang an anti-apartheid song from 
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the 1980s, ‘Senzeni Na?’ (What have we done?). Amid these squabbles, preparations for the 
2010 world cup were in full swing. Ironically, those who suffered the worst deprivation under 
apartheid also ended up paying the highest price for democracy. A decade into the Promised 
Land, the poorest of the poor remain mired in gut-wrenching misery.  
 
1.2  Problem Statement 
The adoption of neo-liberal policies by the ANC since 1994 has increased the hardships 
experienced by poor communities such as Mandela Park (Khayelitsha). These communities 
are disadvantaged and defenceless against the power of the State. 
 
1.3  Hypothesis 
Community organizations such as the MPAEC make a significant contribution to community 
empowerment by mobilizing and articulating the voices of the poor and vulnerable groups in 
society to resist the State’s hegemony with regards to service cut-offs and household 
evictions. 
 
1.4 Study Objectives 
The objectives of the study can be categorised the following way: 
 
        1.4.1 General objective 
The general objective of the study is to explore the extent to which the MPAEC has 
empowered the Mandela Park community to resist the effects of the neo-liberal 
policies adopted by the State since the structural transformation of the SA economy in 
1996 which they believe is behind the commodification of their means to life. 
 
       1.4.2 Specific objectives 
• Assessment of the impact of neo-liberalism and globalisation on vulnerable groups 
in society; 
• Conceptualising resistance to disconnections and evictions; 
• Understanding how a community reacts when faced with major transformation of 
its livelihood by analysing the activities of the Anti-Eviction Campaign (AEC) in 
Mandela Park 
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1.5 Research Design and Methodology 
This section will focus primarily on the subject of the study, the method of data collection and 
analysis and the research design. In addition, the interview method will be discussed. 
 
1.5.1 Subject of study 
This study focuses on the Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign, community members and 
civil society groups involved in the socio-economic rights’ debate in the township. The 
emphasis of the study is on the grassroots, the organisations, the community members and the 
MPAEC.  The researcher has chosen this area of study because:  
• It has a history of fighting against neo-liberal policies of the State,  
• The researcher is familiar with the activists and members of the community, 
• The township has a rich history both in terms of how it came into existence as well as 
of the demographics of the residents. 
 
1.5.2 Data collection and analysis 
The research methodology follows an approach of data collection that also provides the 
community with the necessary feedback from the study findings: 
• A historical descriptive study of the township will be conducted through census 
statistics, municipal data and literature survey;  
• The information will be analyzed and an overview of the township will be taken into 
account;  
• Several individuals and groups will then be targeted through purposive sampling to 
elaborate on specific issues that the research has highlighted; 
• The next step is to create a first draft of the research paper; 
• The draft paper will then be presented to: 
1) Members of the MPAEC in the form of a focus group or workshop where 
the main issues, which have been highlighted by the research, will be 
reflected and commented upon. The focus group will also create an 
opportunity for self-reflection among group members. 
2) Members of community groups for comment on information. 
• The final thesis will be drawn based on these reflections, comments and 
questions. 
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1.5.3 Research Design 
The design resembles a qualitative approach and provides a holistic account of the research 
topic. The researcher employs a combination of the following research strategies: 
1) Comparative literature survey - This method exposes the researcher to a magnitude of 
data from which the most relevant information can be selected (Brynard & Hanekom, 
1997:58).  
2) Personal Interview Method - This will enable the researcher to probe more extensively 
into an issue by questioning the interviewees (Davids, Theron & Mapunye, 2005:125). 
These interviewees will be selected through the Purposive Sampling Method on the 
basis of their involvement in the MPAEC or their involvement with the community 
e.g. local government officials, the police, etc. 
3) Focus Group Method - This will act as an extension to the interview method. 
Participants from the same background or organization will discuss and interact on 
certain issues pertaining to the study. The participants are selected on a purposive 
basis depending on their levels of activity and positions within community structures.  
4) The researcher will also employ the Direct Observation Method.  
5) Case Study Analysis of Mandela Park including historical descriptive study of the 
community will be done. 
6) The Narrative Approach will also be employed.  
 
1.5.4 Interview Methodology 
The Purposive Sampling method will be employed to select the interviewees based on the 
degree of their involvement in the Mandela Park community. This method will be enhanced 
further by the utilization of the ‘snowball sampling’ method (Mc Donald & Smith, 2002:6). 
Concerning this method, the researcher interviews a particular person, who brings him in 
contact with another person, who in turn brings the researcher in contact with someone else, 
and so on. To achieve this, a combination of personal interview, telephone interview and 
focus group discussions will be employed. Through interviews, community organisation 
materials and qualitative research analysis, the various activities, organisational trajectories 
and emergent relationships with the State, the private sector and other actors in civil society 
(local, national and international) are presented and analysed. A list of all persons interviewed 
will be found at the end of the thesis. 
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1.6 Conceptualization 
1.6.1 Mobilization 
• Prepare forces for action: to organize people or resources in order to be 
ready for action or in order to take action, especially in a military or civil 
emergency, or to be organized for this purpose.  
               (Encarta World English Dictionary & Microsoft Corporation, 1998-2005) 
 
                  1.6.2 Activism 
• Vigorous action: vigorous and sometimes aggressive action in pursuing a 
political or social end.  
    (Encarta World English Dictionary & Microsoft Corporation, 1998-2005) 
 
1.6.3 Apartheid 
• Segregated political system: a political system in South Africa from 1948 
to the early 1990s that separated the different peoples living there and gave 
privileges to those of European origin.  
               (Encarta World English Dictionary & Microsoft Corporation, 1998-2005) 
 
1.6.4 Globalization 
• Global political view: the belief or advocacy that political policies should 
take   worldwide issues into account before focusing on national or State 
concerns.  
• Make something become adopted globally: to become adopted on a global 
scale, or cause something, especially social institutions, to become adopted 
on a global scale.   
• Become or make something become international: to become international 
or start operating at the international level, or cause something, especially a 
business or company, to become international.   
              (Encarta World English Dictionary & Microsoft Corporation, 1998-2005) 
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                  1.6.5 Neo-liberalism 
• Political philosophy: the political view, arising in the 1960s, that 
emphasizes the importance of economic growth and asserts that social 
justice is best maintained by minimal government interference and free 
market forces.  
• A set of economic policies that have become widespread during the last 25 
years or so. Although the word is rarely heard in South Africa, you can 
clearly see the effects of neo-liberalism as the rich grow richer and the poor 
grow poorer. "Liberalism" can refer to political, economic, or even 
religious ideas. “Neo" means we are talking about a new kind of liberalism. 
             (Encarta World English Dictionary & Microsoft Corporation, 1998-2005) 
 
1.6.6 Commodification 
• Traded item: an item that is bought and sold, especially an unprocessed 
material.   
• Useful thing: something that people value or find useful.  
• Making of a product into a commodity: the process by which a product 
reaches a point in its development where one brand has no features that 
differentiate it from other brands, and consumers buy on price alone.  
            (Encarta World English Dictionary & Microsoft Corporation, 1998-2005) 
 
1.6.7 Community 
• People in an area: a group of people who live in the same area, or the area 
in which they live. e.g.  a close-knit fishing community.  
• People with common background: a group of people with a common 
background or with shared interests within society.   
• Nations with common history: a group of nations with a common history or 
common economic or political interests.   
              (Encarta World English Dictionary & Microsoft Corporation, 1998-2005) 
 
      1.6.8 Resistance 
•   Opposition: opposition to somebody or something.   
•  Refusal to give in: refusal to accept or comply with something.   
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• Ability to withstand damaging effect: the ability to remain unaltered by 
the damaging effect of something, e.g. an organism's ability not to 
succumb to disease or infection.  
• A force opposing another force: a force that opposes or slows down 
another force  
(Encarta World English Dictionary & Microsoft Corporation, 1998-2005) 
 
1.6.9 Social Movement 
•   A type of group action. They are large groupings of individuals and/or 
organizations focused on specific political or social issues, in other 
words, on carrying out, resisting or undoing a social change. 
•  A group of people with a common ideology who try together to achieve 
certain general goals; "he was a charter member of the movement”. 
(Encarta World English Dictionary & Microsoft Corporation, 1998-2005) 
 
1.6.10 Repression 
• Being kept down by force: the process of suppressing a population, or 
the condition of having political, social, or cultural freedom controlled 
by force or military means.  
             (Encarta World English Dictionary & Microsoft Corporation, 1998-2005) 
 
1.6.11 Rebellion 
• Attempt to overthrow government: an organized attempt to overthrow a 
government or other authority through the use of violence.   
• Defiance of authority: opposition to or defiance of authority, accepted 
moral codes, or social conventions.   
             (Encarta World English Dictionary & Microsoft Corporation, 1998-2005) 
 
1.6.12 Struggle 
• Great effort to overcome difficulties: a great effort made over a period of 
time to overcome difficulties or achieve something.   
• Fight: a prolonged fight or conflict.  
          (Encarta World English Dictionary & Microsoft Corporation, 1998-2005) 
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1.6.13 Cost Recovery 
• The recovery of all, or most, of the cost associated with providing a particular 
service by a service provider. For publicly owned service providers, this may 
or may not include a surplus above and beyond the cost of production, 
whereas for private-sector providers, it necessarily includes a surplus (i.e. 
profit). In either case, the objective is to recoup the full cost of production 
(McDonald, 2000:18). 
 
1.7 Literature Survey 
This study analyses the operations of the MPAEC and the responses of the community to 
service delivery concerns. The research evaluates the South African economic policy against 
literature on international opinion on the political economy of neo-liberalisation, globalisation 
and service cut-offs. Contemporary global processes are highlighted in this analysis namely 
‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2001:24).   
 
The reader is further introduced to conceptual literature on social movements that are useful 
in understanding the politics and mandates of social movements. Törnquist (1999:23) 
describes social movements as being contextual and relational and being the results of 
powerful economic processes. The study also investigates the centrality of MPAEC’s identity 
as a community-based movement in Mandela Park and the ways in which it defines the 
organisation and politics of the community.  
 
Further, the conceptual debates are placed in the context of the mixture of liberal democracy 
and economic liberalisation of South Africa. These analytical debates are helpful in 
examining the specific ways in which community organisations, activists and the MPAEC act 
as an umbrella movement to negotiate and mobilise on the grassroots level. In addition, an 
attempt will be made to unpack the structural relationship between the complex politics of 
diverse social movements involved in counter hegemonic struggles and these economic 
processes (Chin & Mittleman, 2000:16). 
 
The MPAEC has faced leadership and organisational challenges as a diverse community-
based movement. The study therefore explores the circumstances under which MPAEC’s 
leadership has emerged and how group diversity has impacted upon the organisation.  The 
scarcity of financial resources is a challenge to the sustenance of an MPAEC leadership that 
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reflects the diverse nature of its activists and organisations. MPAEC activists have been 
forced to defend themselves in court as a result of summons for illegal occupation of land and 
State-built houses as well as interdict and arrests by financial institutions for putting evicted 
families back into their houses.  
 
This research compiles the empirical analysis of the MPAEC by exploring the symbolic 
power the movement has generated and the manner in which it resisted the State’s hegemony 
in privatisation and cost-recovery concerns. It gives an account of the damaged relationships 
between the State and the community and elaborates on the effects of conflict on civil society. 
Recommendations are made to mitigate the damage existing in State-community 
relationships. It is hoped that this study will not only be of academic value, but also of value 
to community organisations involved in the contest against neo-liberalism in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 2 – Literature Review 
Introduction 
In this section, the research follows the paths of global economic transformation through 
dramatic shifts in organisation of production, to the restructuring of the local State under neo-
liberalism. In so doing, the study demonstrates the manner in which the 'local' has become the 
staging point for the emergence of new social movements resisting the worst affects of this 
new economic order and the conflict it foments. 
This section is divided into four parts. The first part briefly outlines the contours of the global 
neo-liberal economic order, demonstrating how the set of principles and market reforms 
grouped under this term have come to characterise modern political economy. It offers a 
characterisation of neo-liberalism's accumulation strategy.  
In the second part, the focus turns to South Africa under apartheid and highlights the 
continuities between the global restructuring of capital and the various State reforms and 
specific struggles of communities. This is followed by a discussion and analysis of the 
specific contexts of the transition and the reinvention of the post-apartheid State under the 
tutelage of the market and GEAR (the neo-liberal macro-economic framework adopted by the 
ANC government in 1996).  
The third part focuses on how the changing discourse of the ANC alliance contributed to 
widespread poverty, unemployment and the shedding of vital job opportunities among the 
black poor majority. The final part describes how the ANC optimised and encouraged private 
sector investment in the local State by putting in place a tight legislative framework and 
passing a number of legislation to ensure the survival of the neo-liberal orthodoxy.  
 
2.1 Globalisation and Neo-liberalism 
Different authors over time have suggested various concerns and meanings for the term 
'globalisation' as it became increasingly utilised in the last two decades. Chomsky (1999:7) is 
of the opinion that this 'political economic paradigm' is allowing a handful of private interests 
to maximise their personal profit by controlling as much as possible of social life. It is from 
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this point of view that globalisation is understood to be the intensification and extension of 
the rule of profit and the market over people's collective and individual lives, and not a neutral 
presentation of a new worldwide phenomenon of cooperation. The world's poor majority have 
experienced increasing hardship and poverty during the last thirty years because of the ever-
changing world order (Chin & Mittleman, 2000:102). The rich and powerful have heralded 
globalisation's positive aspects as a new golden age and have come to present it as a 'global 
village' with opportunities for greater wealth generation through the introduction and 
expansion of information and communication technology systems. Some authors however 
argue for an understanding of these changes in a context of the global capitalist system that is 
being subjected to various changing needs (Harvey, 2005:6).  
 
The capitalist crises during the 1960's which was characterised by overproduction, declining 
profits, worker struggles and accumulation, inspired a global search for new areas of 
investment and more markets (Bond, 2000a:24). In an effort to remove obstacles to further 
accumulation, a range of reforms was instituted by capital.  The aim of these reforms was to 
remove the obstacles to the rule of profit over production processes and was subsequently 
grouped under the term 'neo-liberalism'. It is under neo-liberalism that nation-states have 
come to learn that their ability to improve the lives of their peoples and minimise their 
vulnerability to global market fluctuations has been profoundly handicapped. Bond 
(2000b:25) is of the opinion that these neo-liberal reforms translates into increased mobility 
and profit for capital. Neo-liberalism puts a price tag on every aspect of life resulting in the 
market being the sole determinant of value. All life is commodified under neo-liberalism. On 
a global scale, neo-liberalism has resulted in increased unemployment, poverty, deterioration 
of social relations, inability to access municipal services such as housing, electricity, water 
and education (Chin & Mittleman, 2000:102).   
  
Thus, under these reforms and ideology, citizens of the world were forced to subject 
themselves to the rule of the market and to surrender the control of their collective and 
individual lives to profit (Harvey, 2005:7). Water, a natural resource to which people 
previously had free access, has been turned into big business today and people have access to 
it based on their ability to pay. Under neo-liberalism, electricity, water, education, healthcare 
and housing - everything has been commodified (Bond, 2000a:26). The right of access to the 
basic necessities of life such as water, electricity and sanitation, have been turned into a 
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wealth generation opportunity by a capitalist few (2000a:27).  Nattrass & Seekings 
(2001:470- 90) state that neo-liberalism resembles the following key elements: 
1. Privatisation 
This is the disposal of State-owned enterprises, services and goods into the hands of 
private sector, that is, the sale of key industries, schools, banks, hospitals, railroad and 
water. Privatisation results in price increases, which often makes the services and 
goods inaccessible to the poor, and concentrates wealth into the hands of few.  
     2.   Deregulation 
Deregulation is the reduction of State interference with private enterprise and the 
abolishing of State imposed price regulation and any restriction that could be harmful 
to profits.  
     3.  Cutting Public Expenditure 
Social welfare expenditure such as health care and education are reduced. This 
translates into the safety net for the poor being eroded. Public expenditure must be 
reduced while introducing wage moderation and labour flexibilisation.  
     4. The Rule of the Market 
This deregulates private enterprise from any State imposed restrictions irrespective of   
how damaging this could be to society. Greater transparency to global investment and 
trade, the abolishing of price controls, capital, services and goods must have total 
freedom of movement. 
According to Stokke & Oldfield (2004:45), an overwhelming majority of citizens throughout 
the world is experiencing the negative impact of neo-liberal policies as a direct assault on 
their survival systems. As a result, poor people have responded to these policies in a number 
of ways including illegal reconnection of water and electricity, non-payment of services, 
campaigns, protest marches, as well as court battles to ensure that basic services remain 
accessible.  Many groups, individuals, organisations and non-governmental organisations are 
collaborating while others congeal into larger formations to form a united front, the 'Anti - 
Globalisation Movement', to challenge the neo-liberal juggernaut (Harvey, 2005:29).   
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2.2 South Africa - A Neo-liberal Transition 
It is true that one of the greatest tales of global neo-liberalism featured prominently in the 
South African transition to democracy. The logic of neo-liberalism has contributed towards 
shaping the most vital aspects of the modern South African polity. Under apartheid, the 
government ensured that the white minority population received a wide range of social 
protections by means of dispossessing the black majority (Rostron, 2002:12). The pressures 
exercised by various social forces including the activities and resistance of the liberation 
movement, would eventually facilitate the demise of the apartheid. 
  
State and bring to an end the benefits enjoyed by the privileged few.  Leitch (2003:24) is of 
the opinion that the successor government was completely out-manoeuvred by the apartheid 
negotiators during the Congress of Democratic South Africa (CODESA) talks and was given 
very limited space to move. However, it is important to note that the negotiated CODESA 
trade-off was a compromise between capitalist stability and majority rule. The National Party 
handed over the unitary rule of a deeply impoverished and unequal society while the African 
National Congress accepted that there would be no radical redistribution or expropriations and 
has undertaken to safeguard the maintenance of existing production relations. 
 
 According to Bundy (2004:68), the pursuit of neo-liberal orthodoxy by the macroeconomic 
policy of the ANC government and its advocacy of deregulation, debt reduction, investor-
friendly provisions and fiscal discipline, resulted in widespread poverty among the black poor 
majority. McKune (2002:45) states that the South African transition was characterised by a 
'deal' or a 'pact' between the ANC and private capital. Big businesses agreed to sign up to 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) in return for access to global finance and trade as well 
as macroeconomic stability. From a structural perspective, this implied a collaborative 
coalition between the ANC and big businesses, consisting of emerging black business and 
white business, working together in a distributional pact while promoting BEE and 
globalisation (Bundy, 2004:74).  
 
By the time of handing over of power in 1994, the ANC promised to redress the inequalities 
of apartheid and create 'a better life for all'. However, the ability of the ANC to deliver on 
these promises was compromised by the terms of the negotiations of CODESA, which were 
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already set long before 1994 with neo-liberalism as a prominent feature (McKune, 2002:45). 
In an effort to keep up with its image as a liberation movement, this neo-liberal transition was 
portrayed by the ANC as the only manner whereby apartheid problems could be addressed. 
According to Legassick (2004:21), the ANC described the birth of democracy as 'phase one' 
of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), namely that an increasing number of black 
people would have access to higher living standards and BEE. The majority of apartheid's 
victims were told to be patient and to wait for 'phase two' of the NDR, namely the 'trickle 
down effect', when growth led by the private sector trickles down from a first to a second 
economy.  
 
It would not be long before the market logic would slowly erode people's entitlement on basic 
services and develop and commodify these into avenues of wealth accumulation. Gradually, 
the logic of the profit motive would encroach on education, health care, housing, electricity 
and water. Some theorists are of the opinion that the advent of neo-liberalism in South Africa 
had already begun in the1980's with the introduction of changes in the nature of work such as 
labour flexibilisation (Naidoo & Veriava, 2005:62). 
 
 Although GEAR is regarded as a clear articulation of neo-liberalism by the ANC, the 
phenomenon already infected the South African economy at a much earlier interval through 
reforms in the economy and labour. A loan from the IMF for US $750 million was signed in 
1993 by the Transitional Executive Council (TEC). According to Bundy (2004:62), structures 
such as the National Economic Forum (NEF) introduced forms of corporate governance in 
1993 by grouping various sectors together on economic issues such as Value Added Tax 
(VAT). Bundy (2004:73), also opines that the shifts within ANC thinking are best 
demonstrated by holding up the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) against 
GEAR. Although the document’s focus is on redistribution, it still does not seriously 
challenge neo-liberalism's growth path in South Africa.   
 
The crux of GEAR revolves around a greater export orientation, lower pay for young people, 
labour flexibilisation and casualisation, cost-recovery measures, privatisation of services and 
State assets, cuts in social and public sector spending, tax breaks for big businesses, servicing 
the national debt, fiscal restraint and trade liberalisation (Naidoo & Veriava, 2005:61). Under 
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such a neo-liberal system, 'development' is reduced, watered down, and mixed-up with 
'increased growth' with little regard for human life considerations.  It is under GEAR that 
government's role changed from a 'provider' of services to a 'facilitator' or 'enabler' of services 
(McDonald, 2000:4). Under this logic, government has defined its social responsibility role as 
enabling the delivery of services but not delivering the services directly. Under this model, 
market forces became the determinant of real access to services with the State assuming only 
a facilitative role. Naidoo & Veriava (2005:62) note that while there is already a high number 
of people without access to basic services, cost recovery policies will effectively halt access 
for those who are too poor to afford payments and will put access to services further out of the 
reach of those without it.  
 
Meanwhile, service providers lately utilised service cut-offs as the main tool of enforcing 
payment and regulating consumption. This has sparked-off a rise in community movements 
across the country and the mushrooming of community organisations in protest against these 
measures aimed at denying people the basic means to life (Legassick, 2004:20). In an attempt 
to shift the onus of delivery away from the State to the individual, service providers 
introduced the prepaid meter (McDonald, 2000:4). Under the prepaid meter system, the 
individual is forced to cut himself at the point of consumption (self-imposed cut-offs). This 
represents the starkest manifestation of a system where profit is prioritised over human life 
and where the individual is given access to basic services only if he/she can afford to pay for 
it. It is thus clear that the South African transition programme has embraced private capital 
and put neo-liberalism on a strong growth path, the terms of which were already determined 
as part of the negotiated settlement at Kempton Park.  
 
2.3 GEAR, Poverty and Inequality 
Since the adoption of the strategy in 1996, concerned political and social commentators made 
several negative predictions about the effects of the government's Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy, GEAR (McDonald & Smith, 2002:64). Similar to those of citizens of 
most other countries that have adopted neo-liberal economic policies, the lives of millions of 
low-income and poor South African families have been negatively affected by the effects of 
GEAR. Consequently, the changing discourse of the ANC alliance was the main cause of 
disagreement of most MPAEC activists interviewed:  
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“The African National Congress ascended to power in 1994 and told people to work because 
they wanted to remove any thought of entitlement from the collective consciousness of the 
masses, even entitlement based on a history of oppression, entitlements regarding education 
and social welfare as a tool of redress. From 1992 to 1994, people were told that they will not 
be given handouts. By saying 'people will not be given handouts' the ANC actually meant, 
‘they are not in need of reparations, not in need of redress'.  When in essence, the kind of 
reparation people wanted was a job (sic). And then they masterminded GEAR to deliver jobs, 
but certainly not architected to materialise job delivery” (sic) (Sipho Jantjies, personal 
communication, 12 April 2007). 
 
The adoption of the GEAR strategy in 1996 represents the clearest example of the ANC 
government's somersault to the neo-liberal orthodoxy. GEAR delivered an  attack on two 
broad fronts; namely the ability of people to make a living e.g. jobs, and on peoples’ access to 
basic needs e.g. water, electricity and education (Barnett & Whiteside, 2002:91). The ANC 
vowed to go ahead with its implementation despite the widespread criticism and 
condemnation of GEAR, while former President Nelson Mandela branded the strategy as 
being 'non-negotiable'.  
  
The effects of GEAR on poor communities have already been documented. In the last few 
years, many people in civil society have sensed that there was a real increase in their poverty 
while various studies have confirmed that 20-28 million South Africans (45-55% of the 
population) experience dehumanising and ongoing deprivation (Statistics SA, 2004; May, 
2004; Taylor Report, 2002). Statistics SA (2004:14) concludes that when considering 
inflation, on the average, household incomes and expenditure in South Africa have decreased 
between 2000 and 2004. The country also experienced a decrease in the average individual 
income and expenditure. In reality, South Africans became poorer on the average between 
2000 and 2004, especially when poverty is considered in relation to earning and spending 
(Statistics SA, 2004:14). Malnutrition and hunger are common factors among the poor black 
majority especially in the rural areas, where there is a recorded poverty rate of 71%, with 
21,9% of households experiencing regular hunger (Taylor Report, 2002:70). 
 
In all these, children are the worst affected (Leitch, 2003:24). Society in general, as well as 
children and their families in particular, are vulnerable to the long-term repercussions of child 
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malnutrition while the correspondingly high incidence of early school leaving especially by 
girl children provides grounds for concern. The situation of children in South Africa seem to 
be deteriorating all the time and points to an unfolding greater socio-economic crisis. 
However, the reversals in the past developmental gains of poor and working class people 
caused by the combined effects of a rampant HIV/AIDS epidemic, a crisis of affordability of 
basic services and high levels of unemployment, all constitute the real cause for concern. It 
should ring clear warning bells in the ears of the people concerned with socio-economic 
policy (Leitch, 2003:24). The experience becomes more painful for poor working class people 
when they consider the affluent and accumulative wealth of a handful of new elites (those 
with close ties to the ruling elite), who coexist with them. Inequality in South Africa has 
become more pronounced in recent years while the GINI Co-efficient (income inequality 
measurement standard) increased between 2000 and 2004 (Statistics SA, 2004:48).  
 
Under conditions of such extreme inequality, no government can claim the existence of a 
workable and stable democracy because the very essence of democracy becomes 
compromised. Serious questions arise about the political sustainability of the situation as 
these separate worlds are allowed to drift further and further apart. The existence of such a 
desperate situation in a country blessed with good infrastructure as well as significant 
economic resources testifies to the disastrous effects of the government's neo-liberal macro-
economic policy. In most societies in which they have been implemented, neo-liberal 
economic policies have contributed to increased inequality (Leitch, 2003:25). Because it 
prioritises a reduction in social spending, trade and currency deregulation, privatisation, 
export orientation and economic growth, GEAR will remain an anti-poor policy just like its 
counterparts worldwide. All poverty-alleviating measures under this neo-liberal framework, 
against the background of a highly unequal social structure, will amount to nothing 
meaningful but minimal welfare intervention.  
 
Unemployment has increased despite the introduction of new forms of work under the regime 
of flexibilisation and GEAR’s promise of delivering 409 000 jobs by the year 2000 (May, 
2004:14). According to McKune (2002:52), the policy of 'labour flexibilisation' as advocated 
by GEAR, has resulted in the gradual disappearance of the permanent, full-time workforce as 
it encouraged the growth of a seasonal, casual, low-paid, flexible, feminised, unprotected 
workforce and informal trading as a means to survive.  Makinana (2003:11) observes that in 
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February 2002, the official unemployment rate was 29, 4% while in reality; it was about 40% 
since the official figures did not cater for people who were too demoralised to seek work. 
 
Makinana (2003:11) points towards the existence of a critical connection between poverty and 
the labour market. According to him, the increase in poverty, in large industrialised countries 
such as South Africa, is linked to labour market failure. When people lose their jobs, their 
ability to provide for their families is compromised. For many poor households, getting into 
debt or selling their meagre assets is often the only way out to cover their expenses. 
 
When poor people start selling their assets, they fall into an almost irreversible backward slide 
which results in inability to weather-off future economic and personal setbacks. It is 
especially worrisome when productive assets such as cattle or land are sold because it 
destroys the economic pillars of the household and blots out all prospects for future recovery. 
Poor people’s economic desperation can best be seen in the sale of smaller personal items. 
Barnett & Whiteside (2002:92) argue that it is difficult to claim that people are coping when 
they have begun to sell their own clothes or the clothes of their dead; these are actions of the 
desperately impoverished. 
  
According to Barnett & Whiteside (2002:92), the total unemployment figures varied between 
29% and 42% because the country’s formal economy reduced vital job opportunities from 
1994. Leitch (2003:36) points to the development of two important trends. The first is that the 
composition of the pool of working people is changing and the other is that the size of the 
employed pool is shrinking because of these neo-liberal policies. The economic vulnerability 
of the working class increases and hard-won labour rights are being eroded as the public 
sector downsizes, firms casualise, subcontract and as outsource labour and the South African 
economy ‘informalise’ labour (Leitch, 2003:36). Legassick (2004:20) believes one million 
jobs were lost since 1996 and that young people make up three-quarters of the unemployed in 
South Africa.  It would therefore not be surprising if more youths turn to other forms of anti-
social behaviour and crime because they have such few prospects under a highly unequal 
South African societal landscape.  
                 
A particularly bleak scenario develops, which should ring clear alarming bells for policy 
makers when the high fatality level of the impact of HIV/AIDS on young people is combined 
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with the crisis of access to educational institutions, the context of chronic poverty in which 
they live and the absence of future prospects for young people (McKune, 2002:12). Those in 
civil society should understand more clearly the picture behind the statistics – the break-up of 
entire families, orphanhood, hopelessness, hunger, grinding poverty, loss, and the downward 
spiral of human suffering. It is important, both pragmatically and conceptually, that workers 
and leadership understand the link between globalisation's international dictates its negative 
effects on the broader population, and the government’s unswerving adherence to its neo-
liberal macroeconomic strategy.  
 
2.4 A Neo-liberal Legislative Framework 
According to McKune (2002:16), guidelines for Public Private Partnerships (PPP) were 
already published by the Department of Constitutional Development in 1997. This was 
followed by a policy directive guiding infrastructure investment as well as investment in 
water infrastructure, called, The Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework (MIIF). The 
MIIF made provision for new service providers other than the State and made a distinction 
between a service provider and a service authority. 
 
In a clear move to optimise and encourage private sector investment in municipal services, the 
Southern African Development Bank established the Investment Unit  for Municipal 
Infrastructure (IUMI) in 1997 (May, 2004:45). The bulk of the MIIU's funds come from 
international donors but this is spent on strengthening the private sector. Moreover, the 
Municipal Service Provision Restructuring Framework was signed by the Local Government 
Association of South Africa (SALGA) and COSATU in 1998. In accordance with this 
agreement, the public sector as a service rendering entity should be prioritised and be given 
preference. The agreement also concludes that the allocation of resources and the 
prioritisation of needs must be informed at all times by social need and not by profit. The 
agreement further prioritises certain service delivery principles namely democratic 
accountability, cross-subsidisation, lifeline provision, environmental sustainability and 
universal coverage. The agreement also identifies regulatory measures as far as the 
contribution of the private sector regarding the delivery of municipal services is concerned 
and states that it should be in addition to public sector service delivery.  
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In 2000, The Municipal Systems Act was adopted and it states that the basic needs of people 
should be prioritised by means of providing basic municipal services of a minimum level to 
all people based on the principle of universal access (Municipal Systems Act, 2000:20). It 
also states that a cost-benefit analysis should be done and the community be notified if a 
private service provider is considered. Furthermore, the Act states that municipalities should 
ensure access to adequate services and set the tariffs according to the Integrated Development 
Plan (IDP) of the area.  
  
The Strategic Framework for Delivering Public Services through Public-Private Partnerships  
was also published by the Department of Finance in 2001. The Local Government 
Department (DPLG) released the Municipal Service Partnerships White Paper in 2000. This 
document came to market private sector partnerships and used the notion of Municipal 
Service Partnerships to replace Public Private Partnerships (White Paper on Municipal 
Service Partnerships, 2000:3). Local government's role was now redefined to include the 
creation of an enabling environment wherein private service providers could function. The 
White Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships, (2000:4) argues that such service providers 
could collaborate with a municipality in the form of a private company, an NGO, a 
community or a businesses unit. Legassick (2004:19) notes that this is in direct conflict with 
the provisions contained in the 2000 Local Government Election Manifesto of the ANC, the 
1998 Framework Agreement between COSATU and SALGA as well as the Water Services 
Act (1997), which declare public sector service provision as the preferred option.  
 
It is clear that the ANC government worked very hard to ensure the existence of a neo-liberal 
framework for the privatisation of public services, especially judged by the magnitude of 
documents released by them. For McDonald & Smith (2002:47), privatisation is an illusive 
term, encompassing the disposal of public assets as well as introducing private sector 
principles and other private sector activities. According to Desai (2003:24), privatisation in 
the water services sector occurs when “all or some of the operations and assets of public water 
systems are transferred into private hands”.  Commercialisation and commodification is 
closely associated with privatisation. Desai (2003:24) states that commodification occurs at 
the point where services or goods that were previously governed by non-profit rules become 
subject to rules that are profit oriented. As a result, water has to be commodified for 
privatisation to work smoothly. According to Naidoo & Veriava (2005:34), commercialisation 
can be said to have taken place at the point where a public utility adopts business-like 
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operational methods inspired by a clear profit motive. Thus, the argument is not about the 
private sector’s involvement in water issues, because they have always been involved in water 
supply, either as suppliers of materials, constructors in water projects, informal providers of 
water or as consumers. The argument is rather about how deep their involvement is. 
  
In addition to pressures from international formations regarding the privatisation of water, 
GEAR has also been an active supporter of the privatisation of water services in South Africa 
(Naidoo & Veriava, 2005:35). Therefore, one can expect that private capital will play an 
incremental role in water services’ provision, especially in urban areas. According to Naidoo 
& Veriava (2005: 37), the competition between the eight bidders that participated in the water 
privatisation process in Nelspruit in 1998, demonstrates the eagerness of multi-national 
companies to enter this lucrative market. Of all the big water multi-national companies in the 
world, three are actively doing business in South Africa and these are Saur, Sues-Lyonnaise 
and Vivendi. Naidoo & Veriava (2005:38) observe that the notion of private sector 
participation rests on the belief that water challenges should be solved through market forces 
and private sector innovation.  
 
In South Africa, various types of privatisation contracts exist. They include:  
 
Service Contracts: This means that some functions such as billing and meter reading are 
sourced out to local or small businesses. This is usually a short-term measure while 
government remains responsible for operating and managing water systems (O&M) (Bond, 
2000b:24).   
Management of Assets: This implies that the responsibility of managing water issues, such as 
O&M, is given to the private sector. However, the government still decides water pricing and 
continues to finance working capital and investment. These contracts usually vary from three 
to five years’ duration (Legassick, 2004:16).  
Lease Agreements: According to Bond (2000b:41), government facilities are rented out to a 
private company tasked with the responsibility for the O&M of the system that is owned by 
the State. Use of the facilities is paid for by the private contractor. The private operator is 
responsible for setting the tariffs while the capital investment is paid by the State.  The 
duration of these contracts vary between five and fifteen years.  
Concessions: Ownership of the assets remains in the hands of the public sector but O&M and 
investment in water systems is the responsibility of the private operator (Makinana, 2003:11). 
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These concessions are generally longer-term, with the duration varying from 20 to 30 years, 
and they involve a large city with a substantially large scope (2003:01).  
BOT (Build, Operate, Transfer) Agreements: In South Africa, it is known as BOTT and is 
more or less the same as concessions but draws its difference from the fact that the water 
facility is being operated and managed, constructed and financed by a private operator after 
which it is transferred to the  public sector (May, 2004:20).  
Privatisation: According to McKune (2002:17), this entails the disposal of public assets into 
the hands of private capital. The right or the role of the State sector in water management 
ceases to exist. This model is unpopular and not widely followed outside England. South 
Africa follows the French water management model that revolves around management and 
service contracts only.  
 
South Africa's water delivery systems have been influenced by other policies that are not 
necessarily water policies. The privatisation of water services has been fuelled by the neo-
liberal orthodoxy of GEAR, the Municipal Systems Act, and the MIIU, all of which have no 
direct reference to water policies (Rostron, 2002:12).  
 
Section 74.2 (d) of the Municipal Systems Act requires that the delivery of services be as 'cost 
reflective' as possible (Municipal Systems Act, 2000:16). Policies regarding specific services 
like sanitation, water and electricity have similar provisions. A directive of the White Paper 
on Energy Policy of 1999 requires government to develop policies, which promote 'cost 
reflective energy prices' (Mantashe, 2003:37). However, neo-liberalism’s profit prioritisation 
is most clearly articulated in the National Sanitation White Paper of 1994. Mantashe 
(2003:37) argues that, “To ensure sustainable systems of sanitation, it would be important for 
users to pay”. The objective of full cost recovery is made clear in some policy documents. 
Policy initiatives such as the Water Services Act, states that “users should bear the entire cost 
of bringing the service to them and also the cost of the management of catchment areas” 
(Water Services Act, 1997:13).  
 
Desai (2003:9) states that the punitive measures for non-payment of services imposed by local 
authorities on a deeply impoverished people provide for the most visible manifestation of the 
widely predicted negative effects of neo-liberalism in South Africa. Household evictions, 
attachment of property and service cut-offs, receive considerable media attention and are now 
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common throughout the country (Desai, 2003:10). In legal terms, section 104.1 (f) of the 
Municipal Systems Act legalizes 'the seizure of property' by local authorities in instances 
where users don’t pay their municipal bills (Municipal Systems Act, 2000:23). Because local 
authorities are not able to supplement significantly their pool of own-revenue through 
progressive tax methods, they now want to expand and finance the delivery of services by 
means of pursuing fuller cost recovery (Rostron, 2002:12).  
A new kind of apartheid is being created by the prerequisites of the cost recovery model. 
McDonald & Smith (2002:35) argue that cholera researchers in the 1980s attributed the 
epidemic to the apartheid policy and that this alarmed apartheid policy makers because they 
believed the disease was water-borne. In an effort to stop contagion, the most affected areas 
were provided with safer sanitation by the apartheid State (McDonald & Smith, 2002:36).   
 
However, these reversals in past developmental gains under an ANC regime that criticized the 
apartheid medical model made poor people to feel that they have been betrayed and sold out 
by the very liberation movement they have come to put their faith in. It is also the same 
liberation movement that came into power in 1994 that turned off the water-taps provided by 
the apartheid government in these cholera affected areas only because the people were too 
poor to afford the newly commodified item – water (McDonald & Smith, 2002:37). 
 
McDonald & Smith (2002:34) argue that the 2000 Kwa Zulu-Natal cholera outbreak started in 
the Ngwelezane area as the local authority began cutting off access to clean water and forced 
hundreds of people to resort to unsafe sources of water and to drink from nearby rivers and 
streams. A hundred and seventy six innocent lives were lost while a further 83,600 vulnerable 
people were infected in the most devastating cholera outbreak in democratic South Africa as 
the ANC government pushed forward with its implementation of cost recovery and the 
unpopular GEAR strategy.   
 
Conclusion 
The rhetorical core of governance since 1994, has revolved around prioritising the 'delivery' 
of basic needs and services to South Africa's poor majority and in doing so, effecting 
meaningful socio-economic redistribution to, and empowerment of, that majority.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 33
As this report has shown however, the reality has not even come close to matching the 
rhetoric, which has recently included President Mbeki's pledge to close the gap between what 
he refers to as the 'first and second economies' of South Africa. The main reason why the gap 
has not closed but actually widened is that the ANC State's approach to governance has 
remained embedded in a neo-liberal foundation. One of the pillars of that foundation is the 
prioritisation, by both State and society, of the accumulative 'needs' of corporate capital (the 
first economy) which, according to the building plan, will therefore provide the means to 
address the needs of the poor (the second economy).  
Not only are the accumulative 'needs' of the capitalists to be the fount of growth and 
prosperity 'for all', but also the enduring socio-economic conditions of the poor themselves 
are identified as the main impediment to such accumulation. Is it any wonder then that an 
increasing number of poor South Africans have been openly and actively asking the 
(rhetorical) question – What kind of democratic governance is this? 
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CHAPTER 3 - Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 
The tendency of ANC politicians and bureaucrats to be dismissive of criticism, coupled with 
their unwavering adherence to the ‘no-alternative to neo-liberalism’ mantra, caused many 
poor people to feel that they have been pushed too far and too hard.  
 
This chapter is divided into four parts that follows the path of the government’s manoeuvres 
to naturalise the acceptance of the duty to pay for municipal services rendered. It begins with 
an explanation of the launching of the ANC’s Masakhane Campaign after the rent and service 
boycotts of the liberation era. The second section chronicles the ‘bread and butter’ realities of 
a desperately impoverished South African people and how the initial gains of the past became 
eroded under the neo-liberal path that the ANC has chosen.  
 
The third section examines the literature of social movements, how they come into existence 
and how their struggles usually revolve around singular issues that are of a periodic nature. 
The last part focuses on the ANC’s attempts to close down all avenues of contestation and 
popular discontent. 
 
3.1 From Payment Boycotts to Masakhane 
An important strategy of the liberation movement during the apartheid era was encouraging 
non-payment of services and rent boycotts (Adler & Steinberg, 2000:27). Edigheji (2003:23) 
notes that under apartheid, people's life strategies were underpinned by a general sense of 
commitment and unity in the fight against a common enemy namely the Apartheid State. As 
the ANC ascended to power in the early 1990s, much of the values and characteristics of 
shared ownership over resources would remain with the organisation and its membership. 
According to Adler & Steinberg (2000:27), the ANC government would later embrace neo-
liberalism and adopt the GEAR framework in an effort to introduce good governance under 
neo-liberal dictates. The same shared values would later be called upon by the ruling party to 
support the unpopular commitments and policies it would enter into (Edigheji, 2003:23).  
 
However, before the ANC government introduced privatisation and cost recovery as a policy 
option, it campaigned widely to prevent people from opposing the obligation to pay for basic 
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services (McDonald & Pape, 2002:37). The government embarked on a campaign named 
Masakhane (building together) in recognition of the strong culture of refusal to pay for 
services that was built during the liberation struggle. As responsible citizens of the new 
democracy, people were encouraged to pay for basic services. The Masakhane Campaign 
labelled the 'refusal to pay' as irresponsible and called it 'a culture of non-payment'.  
 
Through Masakhane, the government recognised that people have to change their views about 
their relations to their basic needs and to each other (Bond, 2000a:24). According to Bond 
(2000a:24), this was especially important since government wanted to implement neo-
liberalism based on the logic of individualised relations between basic services and people. At 
the same time, Masakhane encouraged individual responsibility for access to services as a 
sign of good citizenship. Masakhane naturalised the payment of basic services and advocates 
the right of companies to demand payment for services provided whilst promoting the 
acceptance of the duty to pay.  
 
Edigheji (2003:25) states that South Africa's political somersault to neo-liberalism coincided 
more or less with the period of the Masakhane Campaign and resulted in the increase of 
precarious forms of work, the introduction of cost recovery logic in all spheres of life, and 
wide spread job losses. Heller (2003:142) affirms that the daily grind of poor people in neo-
liberal South Africa resulted in the failure of Masakhane whilst the non-payment of basic 
services continued unabated as it became simply impossible for the poor to pay. As the 
Masakhane Campaign ploughed to a halt, the accumulation of personal debt in the form of 
service arrears became commonplace among the poor (McDonald & Pape, 2002:39). Service 
cut-offs became widespread as local authorities implemented aggressive cost recovery 
policies which resulted in the advent of community movements whose primary aim was to 
protect the right to access basic services such as water and to re-connect people to electricity 
and water supplies. The ANC’s response was to criminalize the legitimate struggles of poor 
communities, marginalise protest actions against commodification, and arrest people for 
illegal re-connections (Bond, 2000b:27).  
 
Heller (2003:142) states that in certain instances, the ANC government has responded to 
people's demands by providing concessions such as free 'lifeline' amounts of electricity and 
water to poor households. However, in an attempt to further the logic of commodification, the 
ANC sought for more ingenious ways to contain or circumvent contestation and has not 
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deviated from its commitment to implement neo-liberalism (2003:142). In some instances, the 
State utilised the same vehicle of struggle to entrench and popularise the commodification 
logic. One such example is the regulation of electricity and water consumption through the 
introduction of the prepaid meter (Adler & Steinberg, 2000:32). Promoted as a people-
friendly initiative to prevent over-indebtedness and regulate consumption, the State utilised 
popular campaigns and certain civic organisations to market the initiative.  
 
Edigheji (2003:51) points out that the prepaid meter forces people to pay before receiving the 
service and as a result, the people remain cut-off until they are able to pay. Prepaid 
technology also came to redefine and individualise the responsibility for accessing services by 
shifting the onus away from the State as service provider unto the shoulder of the individual. 
Prepaid technology has also proven to be more difficult to bypass and to tamper with and has 
increasingly prevented the contestation of the commodification system by means of illegal re-
connections (Mc Donald & Pape, 2002:40).  
                  
3.2 Reversals in past developmental gains 
According to Bond (2000a:139), cost-cutting and cost-recovery measures became an almost 
inevitable choice as local authorities were given an expanded scope of responsibilities 
coupled with reduced transfers from the national fiscus. In many instances, municipalities 
were forced to opt for the easiest but harshest methods namely service cut-offs by means of 
installing prepaid technology or by direct administrative intervention (Leitch, 2003:66). 
 
As the pursuit of cost recovery policies gained momentum with local government bodies, 
many of the initially acquired gains pertaining to sanitation, electricity, housing provision and 
water have undergone serious erosion in the past few years (Desai & Pithouse, 2003:16). 
Surprising though, was the silence of local authorities on the huge cutbacks in central 
government transfers. Leitch (2003:69) is of the opinion that local authorities failed to 
challenge the ANC government for bigger transfers from the national fiscus. Instead, local 
authorities pushed harder to gather the entire costs of delivering basic services to poor 
households whilst accepting the fate of unfunded mandates.  
 
According to Legassick (2004:18), the policy of cost-recovery had very far-reaching effects 
on the lives of poor people and amounts to an attack on their standard of living. Through 
evictions, cut-offs, overt violence, intimidation and legal action, cost recovery have come to 
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ensure its place under the South African sun. In addition, the cost recovery logic was in many 
instances enforced in ways that often reminds one of apartheid-style of forced removals and 
evictions (Desai & Pithouse, 2003:17).  
 
In the context of a high unemployment rate coupled with an already harsh economic climate, 
the daily grind and financial hardship of millions of poor South Africans have been 
dramatically worsened by these neo-liberal policies (Nattrass, 2003:55). Some theorists claim 
that many people in urban areas are unable to afford service charges as well as payments on 
their tiny sub-economic houses and as a result, have moved back to informal settlements 
(Habib & Kotze, 2003:31). According to Edigheji (2003:51), many people have fallen victim 
to water and electricity cut-offs and have been forced to rely on illegal re-connections and 
fetching water and wood from unsafe sources. Very often, eviction notices and debt 
summonses are served in cases where illegitimate re-connections to services were made 
(Edigheji, 2003:21). However, it is the marches and protests against the impact of neo-liberal 
policies and the increasingly repressive and violent responses of the State, that prompted 
some authors to write about the 'criminalisation' of the poor (Desai & Pithouse, 2003:17). 
 
A direct consequence of the fact that people had to revert to unsafe water sources is the 
reports of cholera outbreaks in KwaZulu-Natal in 2000, which made national headlines in the 
domestic and international media, and articulates the clearest example of the negative effects 
of cost-recovery policies on basic health (Habib & Kotze, 2003:31). According to Legassick 
(2004:14), many HIV-positive family members who are terminally ill and suffer from 
incontinence, vomiting and chronic diarrhoea are being taken care of by households without 
access to safe running water or toilets. The basic necessities for the treatment of infectious or 
terminal illness, as well as the provision of hospice and home-based care to people suffering 
from HIV/AIDS have reached an all-time low as the crisis around the affordability of 
municipal services gains momentum.  What was found to be a political system increasingly at 
odds with the basic needs of its own people and a serious indictment of a society, is the 
contradiction that such a situation is allowed to exist in a country much praised for having one 
of the best constitutions in the world (Leitch, 2003:69). The daily grind of poor households 
under the cost recovery logic of the ANC State made it inevitable for poor people to feel that 
they have been pushed too hard and too far.  
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According to Makinana (2003:10), municipal authorities were branded as the immediate 
oppressors of community struggles and have largely been the focus of social movements 
because in most cases, they had to implement these unpopular policies.  Additionally, Stokke 
& Oldfield (2004:76) affirm that there has been no official review of cost recovery policies 
and their impact despite the increase in community protests all over the country. The 
unwavering adherence to the view that neo-liberalism has no alternative, coupled with a 
tendency to be dismissive of criticism, are only some of the strategies that ANC politicians 
and bureaucrats have come to embrace (Hardt & Negri, 2000:26).  
 
According to Makinana (2003:12), the ANC followed a more 'business like running' of 
municipal services, while the State, instead of being an active service provider, acts only as an 
ensurer of basic services. Makinana (2003:14) also notes that basic services first had to be 
corporatised before being eventually privatised. Moreover, Heller (2003:22) states that people 
with the correct political connections benefited a lot from these wealth generation 
opportunities since they managed to secure board memberships of various companies such as 
the Johannesburg Water Company and Umgeni Water in Durban. According to Makinana 
(2003:14), the prepaid meters that have been installed at gunpoint in Soweto, were 
manufactured by Conlog Holdings, a company that had the late Joe Modise, who passed away 
not so long ago, as one of its directors. He was a prominent cabinet minister of the African 
National Congress. Makinana (2003:14) also asserts that the former ANC Treasurer General 
in KwaZulu-Natal, Diliza Mji and Lawrence Mushwana, the previous intelligence boss of the 
ANC, were both directors of Dynamic Cables, the company that was contracted to supply 
cables for the prepaid meters.  
 
Even as electricity and water have finally been privatised, the ANC required that 
multinational companies collaborate with upcoming black entrepreneurs for the Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) (Habib & Kotze, 2003:31). This move has seen local elites 
becoming very rich while the gap between the country's rich and poor continue to widen. 
Heller (2003:57) states that the costs of basic services have already dramatically escalated as a 
result of commodification.  But where will the poor obtain the financial resources to afford 
municipal services when living in a community where unemployment is endemic?                                           
 
According to Stokke & Oldfield (2004:76), more than 75 000 ‘Cape Townians’ have 
witnessed the suspension of their water services between 2003 and 2004. For Edigheji 
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(2003:45), this means that each community is required to fork out the entire municipal service 
provision since cross-subsidization is rejected by the neo-liberal logic. Moreover, in some 
suburbs which remain largely white, rich people pay far less than poor people for basic 
services (Desai & Pithouse, 2003:17). It is the same black poor, who remain at the receiving 
end of the State’s coercive measures taken against the weakest of society, whilst trying to 
extract payment in the form of service cut-offs, evictions, and repossession of property at 
gunpoint.  
 
Edigheji (2003:47) states that cross-subsidization of the poor by the rich is rejected by the 
State since the rich succeed in lobbying for the maintenance of their privilege. As a result, the 
black poor are squeezed dry in order to enrich the bourgeoisies, who enjoy a highly parasitic 
advantage over the poor (Edigheji, 2003:47). According to Stokke & Oldfield (2004:76), the 
free electricity and water provided by the State in response to the social struggles, are 
completely inadequate and are in direct contrast with past commitments and promises, while 
the process of implementation and decision making also remains unilateral. Moreover, the 
neo-liberal discourse of the ANC State facilitated a return of the self-help logic that operated 
under colonialism, in which poor people had to deliver themselves from poverty; this resulted 
in the naturalising of the maxim, 'survival of the fittest’.  
 
3.3 The Rise of Social Movements 
According to Rostron (2002:15), the struggles of poor communities were not aimed at the 
forcible overthrow of the government although they robustly opposed the neo-liberal socio-
economic policies. McKune (2002:45) believes that enforcing notable changes in the content 
and character of State functioning has always been a focal point of these community 
struggles. When grounding the goals and purpose of their socio-economic and political 
struggles, poor communities have often referred to two famous documents namely the RDP 
and The Freedom Charter, both of which affirm that 'the people shall govern' (ANC, 
1994:01). However, something far different has been experienced by poor communities 
because irrespective of what the people desire and need, 'The Party and State shall govern' 
seems to be the norm. Rostron (2002:15) states that the contextual backdrop of the 
antagonistic activities of newly emerged social movements emanated from the so-called 
'contract with the people' and the broken governance pledges and promises made by the ANC.   
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Adler and Steinberg (2000:30) claim that, in the last decade, South Africa has been regarded 
as a progressive and inclusive democracy by both international and domestic politicians and 
commentators. Most of the ‘Chapter 9 institutions’1 and the various structures that seek 
consensus in the Constitution have resulted in worldwide praise of the document. From a 
distant perspective, the South African democracy appears healthy, especially if judged by the 
existence of a plethora of social movements and organisations and a vibrant multi-party 
political system.   
 
However,  the reality of the South African situation, as analysed and catalogued in this study, 
is the narrow and enforced institutional boundaries of liberal bourgeoisie democracy; the 
manner in which it is implemented; and the high levels of socio-economic inequality (Hardt & 
Negri, 2000:26). A wide range of social movements began to surface as the  ANC continued 
its assault on the dignity of the poor through increased retrenchments, service cut-offs, and 
evictions (Stokke & Oldfield, 2004:78). The lack of land redistribution, household evictions, 
and the disconnection of electricity and water services, were some of the main issues 
challenged by these movements. In direct response to State policy, and not because of 
marginality or poverty, new social movements started mobilising people mainly on defensive 
and particular demands (McKune, 2002:45). The ANC government's unwillingness or 
inability to be the guarantor of collective consumption and a provider of public services 
offered a special spark to the plethora of community movements. 
  
Because of the general nature of the socio economic crisis, community movements point and 
concentrate their diverse demands in the direction of the ANC government as they continue to 
focus on issues such as access to health facilities, housing, electricity, water supply, and land 
titles (Stokke & Oldfield, 2004:79). Rostron (2002:14) argues that mobilisation as the only 
vehicle of social contestation is the main issue that distinguishes these community movements 
from trade unions, NGOs, pressure groups, and political parties. The rise of civil 
organisations also resulted in another important phenomenon, the rise of poor families as an 
indispensable source of counter-politics and counter-power. The irony however, is that the 
                  
1 These are independent institutions established under Chapter 9 of the 
South African Constitution. 
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struggles of community movements only seemed to ensure that poor people remain in 
apartheid’s ghettoes (Desai & Pithouse, 2003:29).  
 
The increase in State repression coupled with the breaking-up of challenges from outside 
corporatist structures by an  ANC which is weighed down by the increased militancy of the 
poor, pose a significant threat to social movement activity in South Africa (Habib & Kotze, 
2003:40). A real danger that can facilitate the demobilisation of community movements is the 
success of certain campaigns such as 'Operation Khanyisa' (switch on the lights), as people 
would no longer see the need for collective action once their lights are switched on. 
                                                                                          
The attainment of access to basic services contributed to abating people’s anger and served as 
a catalyst for further social movement activity (Habib & Kotze, 2003:42). Because social 
movement activities are single-issue focused, particularistic and localised, there is a real and 
constant danger to their future existence. The State now exposed at a public level and faced 
with collective resistance from an increasingly militant society, simply moves to less 
organised areas and retreats from militant ones. 
   
According to Legassick (2004:21), a serious challenge faced by the ANC government is the 
activities of the civil organisations. In a struggle aimed at preventing disconnections and 
evictions, community movements managed to  stand up against the might of the ANC state 
and bravely defied  its cost recovery policies (Desai & Pithouse, 2003:40). Leitch (2003:59) 
states that the creation of ‘no-go zones of de-commodification’ and the re-appropriation of 
basic needs by illegally re-connecting electricity and water, have reached catastrophic levels 
in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. In a struggle that has already produced martyrs, 
legends and heroes, community movements succeeded in inflating the number of people on 
the street to 20 000 during the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Leitch, 2003:59). 
As incipient as they might be, the activities and existence of new social movements have 
contributed positively to the entrenchment of South Africa’s democracy, and do not only 
come as a result of contemporary South Africa's socio-economic realities (Ngwane, 2003:22).  
 
It is clear that social movements are providing a real challenge to the boundaries of politics in 
the country. They speak the language of the poor and they articulate the interest of the poor. 
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They affirm the pursuit of a deep-rooted, vibrant and people-centred democracy that was also 
once adopted by the ANC (Rostron, 2002:16). The new community movements have initiated 
a struggle towards a more participatory and radical collective practice of democracy unlike 
the liberal, individualistic bourgeois democracy that came with neo-liberalism. The opinion of 
an MPAEC activist, Jiba Philemon affirms this: 
 
“People are encouraged to group together in order to have one big voice to speak from...and 
to create this as a platform to challenge social injustices” (personal communication, 4 April 
2007).  
  
Another MPAEC activist, Goboza Fonky asserts that: 
“All our poor communities are having a common outlook (sic) and are affected by a common 
problem. This common problem is what unifies us right-through South Africa, right-through 
the globe” (personal communication, 4 April 2007). 
 
Moreover, many domestic and international movements, organisations, academics and 
individuals have started sympathising with the new social movements and supporting their 
struggles (Jaglin, 2002:23). Subsequently, new social movements have started networking 
with other struggles and movements across national boundaries and formed important 
alliances such as the International Anti-globalisation Movement (Ngwane, 2003:37). Social 
movements have forced political and social forces like COSATU, which harbours negative 
feelings towards social movements, to respond to and acknowledge both organisationally and 
politically, the import and impact of these struggles (Jaglin, 2002:23).  
 
According to Rostron (2002:13), the positive impact of social movements on the deepening 
and extension of democracy across national boundaries can be attributed to the fact that social 
movement activity is centred at the level of the grassroots. . In addition to this, the movements 
follow a bottom up approach of engagement, complemented by a dominant character and 
content of struggle. As a result, new possibilities for meaningful dialogue and new avenues 
for engagement have opened up but otherwise have not succeeded in decreasing State-
community conflict (Makinana, 2003:11). The increased activities and demands of the 
bedrock constituency of the ANC government, the black poor majority, have made it 
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impossible for the ANC to simply marginalise or ignore new social movements. Moreover, 
every citizen of South Africa, who has a general interest in ensuring not only the survival but 
the flourishing of its young democracy, should encourage these developments as they provide 
for a healthy and robust political atmosphere.  
 
Jaglin (2002:25) observes that a major point of conflict and grievance at the local level in 
poor communities is State accountability to the citizenry. The breadth and depth of active 
participatory democracy has always been the key for realising democratic accountability by a 
ruling party or the State. State officials and party representatives must be willing to champion 
listen to and engage in dialogue with the citizenry about their needs. On the contrary, the 
ANC government has followed the strategy of limiting participatory democracy by putting 
institutional structures in place and presenting it as the only legitimate forums for listening to, 
and negotiating with the citizenry (Edigheji, 2003:27). The ward committee at community 
level is regarded as the dialogue structure for ensuring community participation. However, 
social movements quickly learned that the door to active participation both inside and outside 
these institutional structures of the State has been closed on them (Edigheji, 2003:27).  As one 
MPAEC member, Magoka Samuels notes: 
 
“The majority of people participating in the ward committees have been lobbied by the ANC 
and told to be loyal to the organisation. They don't tolerate something (sic) that is not coming 
from them, the ANC... they accuse us of being against the ANC... We inform them that we are 
opposed to the policies of the ANC, but not against the organisation” (personal 
communication, 14 June 2007).   
 
Most social movements have been accused by State officials of being unable to engage 
constructively and effectively at the grassroots level (Jaglin, 2002:26). A factor that impacted 
on the moral, organisational and political hegemony of the State and the ANC was the 
activities of social movements outside the existing institutional structures of accountability. In 
addition, social movements continued their attempts to keep the door to the ANC's dialogue 
structure at the local level open (Edigheji, 2003:28). Consequently, a social movement 
accountability struggle confronted the ANC, one that could not be marginalised or entirely 
controlled by them. In communities characterised by a high degree of social movement 
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activity, and where social movements enjoy popular support, the ANC tried its best to 
resurrect the widely discredited and moribund South African National Civic Organisation 
(SANCO) in an attempt to re-consolidate its organisational and political hegemony in poor 
communities (Hardt & Negri, 2000:29). The words of the Western Cape ANC Provincial 
Secretary, Ncebisi Skwatcha, illustrate this observation: 
   
“In order for the priorities and programmes of government to be shaped by communities... 
and to keep ANC councillors close to the people, we need a strong civic movement. The ultra-
revolutionaries will mislead our people if we don't have a dynamic and strong SANCO” 
(personal communication, 7 May 2007).    
 
According to McDonald & Pape (2002:68), the nation’s electricity supply company, ESKOM 
announced in 2001 that it had reached an agreement with SANCO to write-off large amounts 
of arrears of electricity bills in Johannesburg. This was however a cheap political stunt to 
undermine social movements whose struggles over prepaid meters and electricity cut-offs that 
forced the State to act. Although the door to active and direct participatory democracy has 
been shut in their faces, the new social movements have transformed the field of 
accountability and governance, whether the ANC wants to admit it or not. 
 
3.4 Closing down the Space for Dissent and Contestation   
The self-reproducing discourse of repression and marginalisation caused by the current terms 
of State-community conflicts is by far the greatest danger presented by the war over basic 
services (Adler & Steinberg, 2000:124). However, one would discover that the root of this 
process is embedded in the South African transition programme itself. Adler & Steinberg 
(2000:125) are of the opinion that the strategic trajectory of the ANC underwent a more 
general shift when it started negotiations with the Apartheid State after it returned from exile 
in the early 1990s. Some theorists argue that in the 1990s, the ANC watered down the 
achievements of the struggle by allowing 'negotiations' to become the supreme organising 
principle of its political strategy (Desai & Pithouse, 2003:39). 
  
According to Nattrass (2003:49), grassroots activists shifted their focus to other struggles that 
ran parallel to the actual negotiations of that period as the Apartheid State relaxed its 
repressive apparatus, resulting in a high degree of community mobilisation. Nattrass 
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(2003:49) states that the ANC then started to re-orient the liberation movement to manage and 
suspend bread and butter struggles in an effort to prevent these struggles from detracting from 
the strategic course that the ANC has chosen. This move has caused many organisers of the 
liberation movement to become preoccupied with pacifying their members (Nattrass, 
2003:50). By the time of handing over of power to the ANC government, a 'negotiations-
centric polity' had been institutionalised by the ANC and most avenues of contestation had 
been closed down (Nattrass, 2003:51).  
 
Adler and Steinberg (2000:129) comment that the ANC sold this strategic approach 
(institutionalised negotiations) as the only legitimate form of societal contestation and assured 
its incremental incorporation into the national imagination. Consequently, the overarching 
theme within the ANC and the government has ensured that any form of dissent is elbowed 
out and is regarded as anathema to it. In addition, all real space for strategic and ideological 
contestation had been closed down by the reconciliatory language of the ANC's national 
discussion such as Batho Pele, nation building, constructive engagement, etc (Adler & 
Steinberg, 2000:130).  
 
For Bond (2000b:62), the placement of civil society organisations on the edge of the main 
current of the national interest comes as a result of the terrain these movements chose to 
occupy in civil society. He further argues that the possibility of finding institutional remedy 
through negotiations has been undermined by the terrain on which new social movements 
were forced to struggle due to the ANC's foreclosure of dialogue on macroeconomic policy 
and its import of neo-liberal restructuring. The national imagination constructed by the ANC, 
has consequently viewed these struggles as 'something uncomfortable' (Nattrass, 2003:52).  
 
Meanwhile, the ANC government promoted its reconstruction and nation building agenda 
while discrediting the active resistance of social movements as being out of sync with the 
times (McKune, 2002:113). Race and class dimensions of the present conflict have 
consequently been obscured by this characterisation of community movements and their 
struggles. According to McKune (2002:114), the ANC opted to present the country as a 
homogeneous unit of one happy family while at the same time, dismissing the challenge 
posed by these community struggles. As a result, the image of harmony demanded by the 
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market and investors was jealously protected in the South African corridors of power. 
Moreover, the default consensus was that outside of the corporatist structures of engagement, 
there would be no terrain for civil society to engage with the State (Wooldridge, 2002:37). In 
this context, the objective interest of the nation provided justification for State repression of 
socio-economic struggles. Almost exclusively, such struggles are viewed as challenging the 
public order. According to Harvey (2005:62), social movements have no other avenue 
through which they can get justice than by protesting. In addition, this process resulted in the 
naturalisation of their continued marginalisation. In this manner, it is considered illegitimate 
and criminal to contest State policy outside the institutionalised structures of dialoguing. 
   
The widespread criminalisation of dissent has its basis in the manner which the State is 
building up the imagination of the nation (Wooldridge, 2002:38). In this view, the poor are 
used as marionettes by outside forces and interests when they engage in mass action even at 
the local level. A local ward councillor, Solomzi Nguta characterises the MPAEC thus:  
 
“The Mandela Park community was not against the project and it was not really them (sic) 
who were ‘toy-toying’, there are individuals behind this who want to mislead the community 
and want the benefits for themselves” (personal communication, 22 March 2007). 
   
According to this view, dangerous individuals with self-serving agendas are behind these 
basic socio-economic struggles (Harvey, 2005:67). In an effort to undermine the credibility of 
their criticism, people participating in mass action are stigmatised in various ways. They are 
dismissed as being unpatriotic, militant, misled stooges, foreigners or agent provocateurs 
(Harvey, 2005:68). Wooldridge (2002:37) notes that by branding and stigmatising people 
involved in protest action, the State wants to naturalise the marginalisation of social 
movements while the subsequent repression of dissent and the non-negotiability of GEAR are 
indicative of the refusal of the government to talk to community organisations.  For Hardt & 
Negri (2000:34), the vicious cycle becomes complete as civil organisations have to revert to 
public protest to have their demands heard.  
 
Heller (2003:133) explains that the effective marginalisation of contestation and the heavy-
handed reactions to dissent over GEAR within its own ranks provide an indication of the 
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ANC's approach to meaningful democratic opposition. The words of Joel Netshitenzhe, ANC 
head of government policy can be considered noteworthy: 
 
“When pressure is exerted from below, the aim should be to complement the activities of 
those that exert pressure from above against the old order (sic)” (in McKune, 2002:101).   
                
This implies that in the view of the ANC government, it is illegitimate and unacceptable for 
the poor to embark on socio-economic or political struggles against its policies and practices. 
In this context, it is a betrayal of the liberation struggle and a political heresy to go outside the 
institutional and organisational borders of dialoguing, which was laid down by the ANC and 
the ANC controlled government (Jaglin, 2002:28).  
  
Marais (2001:115) states that the ANC continued to portray the new social movements as 
anarchists and criminals, while failing to regard them as frustrated and concerned people 
utilising the only option they are left with to express their grievances. According to Marais 
(2001:115), the ANC leadership chose to utilise the repressive apparatus of the State to carry 
out a sustained attack on poor communities when they realised that their strategy of labelling 
movement leadership failed to suppress the growth and activities of social movements. Both 
peaceful oppositional activities, focussing on ‘bread and butter’ grievances, and the right to 
utilise hard won democratic space had been de-legitimised by a well co-ordinated government 
programme to silence and suppress the collective and emergent contestations of the poor 
(Heller, 2003:134). 
 
In labelling social movements, the ANC Chairperson, Terror Lekota delivered the usual ANC 
rhetoric: 
“There are factions seeking to undermine the democratic victories of the liberation movement 
by irresponsibly pursuing anarchy and confrontation. We wish to condemn these actions since 
our own struggle have taught us that it is the work of the naïve and agent provocateur that 
encourage such mindless violence” (in Wooldridge, 2002:213). 
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With the clear intention of delivering a spine-breaking blow to social movements, the ANC 
State President, Thabo Mbeki soon waded in and portrayed social movements as the enemies 
of the State and liberation movement: 
  
“Foreign and domestic left sectarian sections are carrying out a sustained attack on our 
policies and our movement. Those who treat us as their enemy must know that we will 
respond in adequate measure since we cannot allow the destruction of our young democracy” 
(in Jaglin, 2002:30). 
                                                                                                
Mbeki stated even further that:  
“Our masses have transformed themselves into a constructive and law abiding 
citizenry....they have ended and negated their roles as a protest movement...and they have 
fought a protracted, costly and difficult struggle to attain these...they will never be forced to 
go back there. It is the same individuals who in the past sought to perpetuate and entrench the 
oppression of these masses, who are now opposing and working to destroy the ANC by 
mobilising the people to act against our movement.  These actions go beyond our levels of 
tolerance” (in Marais, 2001:104). 
 
The sustained struggles and mobilisation of new social movements were consistently viewed 
by the ANC and by President Mbeki as being political and as a social provocation, pushed by 
individuals who are riding on the backs of the poor majority in order to advance themselves 
(Jaglin, 2002:29). Legassick (2004:18) alleges that the State's insistence to listen on terms, 
and its refusal to talk, prompted social movements to engage in the struggle on a terrain other 
than that which the State control and dictate.  As a result, the governance relationship of the 
ANC State with the new social movements was characteristic of a self-defeating and 
contradictory understanding and approach to the content and character of democratic 
expression (Ngwane, 2003:37). Moreover, the ANC government effectively provided self-
help, apolitical and non-confrontational community based organisations with resources and 
institutional space while facilitating their development (Ngwane, 2003:56). 
 
It is clear that the ANC is not secure about its governance powers and has been provoked by 
fear and loathing as social movements actively pursued the attainment of socio-economic 
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rights outside the narrow institutional boundaries of a legal and socio-political system that 
generally excludes the poor (McKune, 2002:127). This is affirmed by an MPAEC activist, 
Patrick Ngwenya: 
 
“While exercising political power in death and life, the State wants to define even how 
citizens speak. Human life is separated from political and civil rights, and drawn under the 
sovereign power of the State” (personal communication 22 March 2007).    
 
Conclusion 
From the foregoing, it can be inferred that what was envisaged as 'common' in the liberation 
movement (from basic services to the nature and forms of governance that a new government 
would assume), would thus be slowly encroached on by the market to be commodified and 
developed into areas for accumulation and the constitution of forms of relations and 
regulation appropriate to the logic of neo-liberalism. With time, water, electricity, housing, 
health care and education would come under the logic of the profit motive and any collective 
notion of 'the common' would be denied.  
The limits of the transition have meant that neo-liberal orthodoxy defines the parameters of 
the State's approach to service delivery (or delivery of the ‘commons’). What emerged as a 
result, are two conflicting narratives of the social commons created in the payment boycotts 
of the 1980s. For the State, cost recovery programmes have necessitated a de-legitimisation of 
the commons in the interest of restructuring parastatals and State institutions along lines 
appropriate to its macro-economic priorities. For many communities and critics of the 
government's growth path, in contrast, the commons have come to represent the central 
redistributive challenge of the new State and the need to be institutionalised. 
In the first narrative, the payment boycotts of the 1980s were merely a means of leveraging 
the position of the liberation movement in relation to the Apartheid State. The persistence of 
non-payment in this context has been characterised as a pathology of 'a culture of non-
payment' that requires the intervention of the State only in restoring law and order (i.e. 
payment). The second narrative, in contrast, treats the commons as a fundamental part of the 
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reproductive needs of poor communities, and the social income secured therein, as one of the 
few protections the most vulnerable have in relation to the capitalist market. 
 The clash of these narratives represents the conceptual basis for the contemporary conflict 
between the State and the communities, in relation to basic socio-economic services and their 
'delivery'. 
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CHAPTER 4 - Case Study 
Introduction 
This chapter explains the array of complex arrangements made by the State to respond to 
community demands and 'maintain order' in Mandela Park - the focal point of the case study 
reviewed by this research. Without attempting to present a comprehensive account of all 
engagements in which this movement has been involved, only key moments in its history 
which have characterised the various forms of its relationship with the state have been 
selected.  
The chapter is divided into six sections outlining the antagonistic engagements between the 
State and the Mandela Park community. The first section focuses on the history and migration 
of South African blacks from other parts the country to the Western Cape and the next section 
continues with a historical overview of how Mandela Park came into existence under the 
Botha government. The third section introduces the establishment of the MPAEC and the 
contemporary politics of community organisations. the last three sections  examine the diary 
of events that unfolded as MPAEC activists openly defied and resisted the State’s imposition 
of cost recovery, evictions and service cut-offs on the Mandela Park community.  
 
4.1 Background: Black South Africans in the Western Cape 
The tale of the black man and women in South Africa has always been one characterised by 
exclusion and marginalisation. Hundreds of black South Africans were forced to flee to Cape 
Town as a result of the defeat of the Xhosa war against colonial dispossession in the Eastern 
Cape (Kinkead-Weekes, 1992:4). Cape Town’s first township, Uitsig was built in the late 
1900s when apartheid was at its worst. Uitsig would later become Ndabeni, whose residents 
were relocated to facilitate the establishment of Langa in 1927. 
 
The black population in the Cape Peninsula increased dramatically in the aftermath of the 
World War Two (Fast, 1995:24). A sudden population boom occurred throughout Cape 
Town’s periphery as the new urban influx settled mostly in unregulated shacks and 
pondokkies.  Many were scattered as tenants or plot owners throughout the predominantly 
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coloured and white residential areas while most lived in highly populated residential areas or 
swelled the numbers in the official locations and squatter camps. 
  
Sayers (1987:13) states that racial segregation and influx control legislation turned Cape 
Town into a particular test case in the 1950s while under the apartheid regime. When the 
National Party government emerged in the late 1940s, Mr Jansen, the then Native Affairs 
Minister stated that, “…the drastical (sic) reduction of the Western Cape’s Native population 
is a matter requiring serious consideration” (Kinkead-Weekes, 1992:27).   Mr Eiselen, the 
then Native Affairs Secretary commented in 1953 that the native population “…settled in 
camps that are uncontrollable for local authorities, the ring of illegal, unplanned and 
uncontrollable concentrations of Bantu are drifting towards the cities” (Sayers, 1987:13).  
Similarly, the Cape Town City Council’s Native Affairs Manager told a youthful Ben Turok 
and ANC veteran Dora Tamana in 1954 that, “the reduction of Bantu households residing in 
Cape Town is the policy of this government and migratory labour will be used to satisfy the 
Peninsula’s labour needs”. 
 
Both the Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 and the Urban Areas Consolidation Act of 1945 
legalised the forceful removal of African families and were duly implemented by local 
authorities (Horner, 1983:44). The Urban Areas Consolidation Act of 1945 proclaimed that 
African locations would be established and residence for African families in such locations 
would be compulsory. Horner (1983:45) states that section 23 (1) of the Urban Areas 
Consolidation Act of 1945 declared the entire Cape Peninsula as a Coloured Labour 
preference area.  The Prohibition of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 also placed statutory 
obligations on local authorities to cooperate with the provisions of the Act, to implement 
compulsory location residence for African families, demolish shacks without court order, 
remove Africans that are squatting illegally, and to establish emergency camps (Horner, 
1983:46).  
 
A powerful instrument in the organising of forced removals was the imposition of passes on 
women in 1954.  According to Makosana (1988:25), the Western Cape then saw a period of 
violent forced removal of African families and the destruction of unregulated residential 
areas. Most of the African families were removed to Langa where they were forced to live in 
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emergency camps in portions of the location or in single male hostels. Others were removed 
to the Nyanga location established in 1946 and to Nyanga East that came into existence in 
1958 and was renamed Gugulethu in 1961 (Kinkead-Weekes, 1992:330). After being sifted 
out by the authorities to Gugulethu, qualifying Africans could remain in the Peninsula as 
families and were allocated houses while ‘illegal’ Africans were completely deported from 
the Cape Peninsula area (Kinkead-Weekes, 1992:331).  Many women forced to leave Cape 
Town altogether because they were particularly ill-treated by the apartheid authorities. The 
breaking up of family structures by turning as much of the African population as possible into 
migrant labourers was a particularly important strategy of the apartheid state (Meier, 
2000:123). Moreover, the year 1954 witnessed the declaration of the Western Cape as a 
Coloured Labour Preference area (Horner, 1983:46).  
 
By the mid-1950s however, large numbers of the African population could still be found 
residing outside locations in the Cape Peninsula (Bank, 2002:15). According to Bank 
(2002:15), these areas included Grassy Park (Cook’s Bush) with 3800 Africans; Rylands in 
Athlone – 5200; Retreat – 5500; Salt River, District Six and Woodstock – 9300; Bellville, 
Goodwood and Elsies River – 13000; and Windermere – 15000.  Furthermore, Bank 
(2002:17) states that most people were forced to move out of these settlements as authorities 
continued to demolish shacks in these areas.  According to Greenback (1992:21), determined 
struggles were organised by ANC activists in certain cases but none proved successful against 
the repressive apparatus of the Apartheid State. In February 1975, Crossroads was established 
as a squatter camp and represented the first example of a successful but bruising struggle 
against the council-led demolition of shacks.  
 
But before the struggle of Crossroads could fascinate the generations which followed, three 
squatter settlements around  the University of Western Cape (UWC) attempted to resist their 
forced removal by apartheid authorities in 1974 (Budow, 1976:45). In the week following 8 
August 1977, apartheid security forces evicted about 10 000 squatters in Modderdam. As 
security forces razed the camp, furniture was hurled onto Modderdam Road by resistant 
squatters as they charged at columns of policemen and chanted freedom songs and hymns. 
Many observers, spectators and squatters were hospitalised as apartheid policemen continued 
to disperse the crowd with teargas and police dogs.  
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From 16 to 20 January 1977, 15000 people were evicted from Unibel while a further 5000 
residents were evicted from Werkgenot on 25 August 1978 (Kinkead-Weekes, 1992:26). 
Kinkead-Weekes (1992: 26) notes that Crossroads miraculously survived the brutal evictions 
due to the consciousness and experience of the women’s committees in the squatter area. 
Inspired by the Crossroads success story, the United Democratic Front (UDF) went on to 
contest the establishment of Khayelitsha (Fast, 1995:28). In a classical manifestation of an 
apartheid-sponsored ‘Black-on-Black’ assault, South Africa witnessed one of its most brutal 
forced removals as 7000 squatters around Crossroads were eventually evicted from their area 
in June 1986 by vigilante groups. However, the clearest articulation of ‘Black on Black’ 
violence sponsored by the Apartheid State appeared in the form of a counter-revolutionary 
violence in Transvaal and in Inkatha in Natal from 1986 up to the 1994 elections (Bank, 
2002:15).  
 
As indicated earlier, the post-1986 influx of Africans into the Western Cape, together with the 
movement of the people into the big cities, resulted in the establishment of Khayelitsha on the 
outskirts of Cape Town (Meier, 2000:124).   
 
4.2 Mandela Park: A Historical Overview 
Apartheid sought to confine black people to the established homelands such as Transkei and 
Ciskei. However, the sustained multiple acts of resistance by liberation forces would 
eventually facilitate the demise of the apartheid regime and by the 1980s, people flooded the 
Western Cape in large  numbers such that the regime could no longer regulate its internal 
borders (Bank, 2002:17). Throughout South Africa, black people occupied new and open 
spaces and named them in honour of their heroes. In Cape Town, the group of Africans who 
occupied a part of the periphery of Khayelitsha defied all odds and named their area Mandela 
Park, as a symbol of hope (2002:17).  
 
Khayelitsha boasts of being the largest township in Cape Town and it is situated 
approximately 26 kilometres from the city centre. It has many sub-locations, one of which is 
the Mandela Park.  The Botha government established Khayelitsha in 1983 and sought to 
enforce compulsory residence for African families in the township (Makosana, 1988:26). 
However, this was unrealistic and proved to be impossible since other townships such as 
Langa, Nyanga, Gugulethu, Crossroads and KTC were already established. Instead, 
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Khayelitsha mushroomed rapidly because of thousands of new immigrants from the Eastern 
Cape as the Apartheid State relaxed its repressive apparatus and repealed its draconic pass 
laws in 1986. Khayelitsha grew rapidly in the 1990s and is possibly the third largest township 
in South Africa after Soweto in Johannesburg and Mdantsane in East London (Bank, 
2002:22).   
 
According to Meier (2000:125), the Apartheid State was in close collaboration with the World 
Bank during the late 1980s and was persuaded by the bank to start making the necessary 
arrangements for the development of public-private-partnerships. According to this view, 
business would provide the capital for development while the investment would be recovered 
from the poor with profit. This strategy turned Mandela Park into a particular showcase of 
private sector-led development since it became the first South African township where a 
distributional pact between government and private capital motivated development. The 
ANC, which was the greatest critic of the apartheid housing policy, would later adopt this 
strategy as its standard housing policy (Meier, 2000:125).   
  
In 1986, commercial banks began building houses in Khayelitsha on land that they bought 
from the State and established Mandela Park within Khayelitsha (Meier, 2000:125). Just as 
Mandela Park was named in honour of the former president, Nelson Mandela, so were all the 
streets of the township named after former heroes of the liberation struggle. In line with the 
struggle tradition of the ANC, names such as Thandi Modise, Ahmed Kathrada, Winnie 
Mandela, Bram Fisher, Peter Mokaba, Jenny Schreiner, Robert McBride, Wilton Mkwayi, 
Albertina Sisulu, James Calata, etc feature prominently on street nameplates in the area.  
These call to mind the time when all occupants of Mandela Park’s newly constructed houses 
were loyal supporters and activists of the ANC. In the early 1990s, the local branches of 
SANCO, the Youth League and the ANC flourished in the area and attracted thousands of 
members (Barnard & Farred, 2004:56).  
 
Regrettably, a household study recently commissioned by the Cape Town City Council 
revealed that fifty percent of families in Khayelitsha survive on less than R167 a month while 
the income of another third of Khayelitsha’s residents stood at R39 per person per month. The 
repercussions of GEAR have come at great cost to Mandela Park’s residents. The 
retrenchment of production line workers as a result of labour flexibilisation and casualisation 
preached by GEAR resulted in widespread unemployment in the area (Kistner, 2002:48). 
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Today, the majority of Mandela Park residents have lost their faith in SANCO, the South 
African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC. The general grassroots feeling is that those 
they have jointly entrusted with their lives have deserted them.  They feel ignored and 
enraged about the ANC‘s refusal to listen to them and to address their housing problems 
(WCAEC, 2003a:1). In place of relief, they have been arrested, detained and evicted from 
their houses. As the ANC government continued its crack down on community movements, 
many activists of the MPAEC were bombarded with strict, apartheid style bail conditions by 
the courts (WCAEC, 2003b:1). Such bail conditions include banning them from attending 
political meetings and being under house-arrest from 6pm to 6am daily.  
 
The voices of a group of singing women outside the Khayelitsha Magistrate Court on the 22nd 
January 2007 echoed an old freedom song, ‘Senzeni na?’ (What have we done?). This evokes 
mixed feelings especially because they direct the question to the government they elected. 
They do have a reason to ask; development in Mandela Park came to a virtual standstill 
because the banks own the vacant land in the area together with the land on which the houses 
are constructed. The electricity, the water, the house, the land – everything has been privatised 
in Mandela Park and there has been no development, no clinics, no schools (cf. Ntanyana & 
Fonky, personal communication, 4 March 2007). What made matters worse is that Leonard 
Ramatlakane, the Western Cape SACP chairperson and the provincial Minister for Safety and 
Security, is the person who presides over this whole strategy of ‘arrests only, no negotiations’ 
(Mackay, 2002:1).  
 
4.3 Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign - The Early Days 
Towards the end of January 2001, groups of community activists began to organise and 
campaign against evictions and service disconnections in Cape Town. According to Barnard 
& Farred (2004:57), Tafelsig in Mitchells Plain represents a clear case of community 
militancy because the people have been battling council-led evictions since the previous year. 
Groups of people came together and identified themselves as the Anti-Eviction Campaign 
(AEC) or Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (WCAEC). Areas such as Mfuleni, Tambo 
Square, Delft, Gugulethu, Valhalla Park, KTC and Athlone represented strongholds of the 
Anti-Eviction Campaign where activists confronted household evictions. In Mandela Park, 
some shop stewards of the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) facilitated 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 57
contact with the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) and were brought in touch with people who 
experienced similar problems all over Cape Town (2004:57).   
 
The AEC devised a strategy that focused on two major fronts namely continued negotiations 
with the banks and government as well as community mobilisation and mass action. By late 
2002, Ramatlakane disparaged the MPAEC, claiming they were only a ‘handful of people’. 
Ironically, the MPAEC succeeded in attracting hundreds of people to its bi-weekly meetings 
in Mandela Park, on Wednesdays and Sundays. An MPAEC member, M. Samuels  relates 
that: 
 
“We were only a semi-organised group at first. It was not until the end of January 2001 that 
our real campaign against the banks started. Every Sunday and Wednesday we held our bi-
weekly meetings, which were attended by hundreds of MPAEC supporters. Leonard 
Ramatlakane accused us of being only a ‘handful of protesters’. But the attendance at the 
meetings tells another story. Leonard Ramatlakane has turned down our invitations to attend 
these meetings and to discuss our demands. He must come and see for himself” (personal 
communication, 14 June 2007).   
 
Leitch (2003:56) states that many local and international activists from countries such as 
Palestine, India, Germany, USA, Norway, Italy, Canada, and Argentina showed solidarity 
with the WCAEC and visited the movement’s office in Tafelsig. As a result of WCAEC 
militancy, the rate at which Cape Town evictions took place slowed down by December 2001 
and effectively halted by June 2002. Many people who were evicted returned to their original 
homes by the MPAEC in March 2002 after they were moved to RDP houses that resembled 
dog kennels.  
 
At first, despair and disbelief in a system that rendered them homeless have drawn many one-
time homeowners of Mandela Park together for meetings in the area. One could hardly notice 
any feelings of antagonism or militancy because only a handful of families were affected and 
in any event, the ANC enjoyed great support in Mandela Park at that time (Alexander, 
2004:62). However, the presence of union activists who had been fortified by years of 
struggle against the profit logic provided a particular spark to the order of events in Mandela 
Park (Leitch, 2003:57). Mandela Park would soon draw on the mobilising skills of these 
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unionists among their midst. Although the WCAEC contributed very minimally in terms of 
resources, the adrenalin injection to the Mandela Park residents came in the form of the 
existence of a strong mobilisation movement with its own rationale and language (Leitch, 
2003:56).  
 
According to Alexander (2004:64) the MPAEC opted to operate on two fronts namely starting 
a programme of mass mobilisation on the one hand, while initiating a legal defence through 
the courts, on the other. The movement managed to draw vital support from various sources 
including free-floating left activists, trade unionists and city-based NGO workers. By means 
of a series of well-attended gatherings, the WCAEC soon established itself in Mandela Park. 
A strong and vibrant antagonism resulted.   
 
4.4 Mandela Park: Under State Assault 
It is not only the Mandela Park community who were subjected to the repressive ferocity of 
the ANC State after more than a decade into democracy. Since the death of Michael 
Makhabane in early 2000 when poor students protested against their exclusion from the 
Durban Westville University, different authors have recorded several police-related killings in 
many parts of South Africa (Barnard & Farred, 2004:59). 
  
In the course of this study, various reports were attested regarding violent clashes between 
law enforcement agencies and community activists, arrests of community activists by security 
forces and their subsequent arraignment in court. Moreover, there were several protests 
against the State’s insistence to install prepaid water meters - a system that would force poor 
people to cut their own supply at the point of consumption because they cannot afford to pay. 
Every night, the clashes continue and there have been serious casualties and numerous arrests.  
Only last year, scores of heavily armed security personnel in armoured vehicles were 
dispatched into Tafelsig Township to enforce water disconnections which affected hundreds 
of people. Recently, the Tafelsig community weathered-off a less armed invasion, using 
stones and burning tyre barricades (Davids, 2007:2).  
 
In late 1999, the Mandela Park community witnessed its first invasion by security forces in 
‘four-by-four’ bakkies. Police officials began sealing off the doors of evicted households, 
throwing furniture and other items onto the streets and disconnecting water and electricity 
(Ntanyana, personal communication, 4 March 2007). Since then, Mandela Park residents have 
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been involved in a protracted resistance against evictions and water and electricity 
disconnections. The people have been engaged in revolutionary struggles and exposed 
themselves to dangers to resist exclusion from education; to retain access to basic services and 
to remain in the houses allocated by the apartheid regime (Davids, 2007:2). This quick and 
brutal crushing orchestrated by an ANC regime that was the dream and aspiration of the poor 
as they fought against apartheid was never anticipated, not even by the most cynical.  
 
During the invasion of Mandela Park in late 1999, law enforcement agencies were armed with 
guns, dogs and teargas. They confiscated even the most meagre assets of the poor and evicted 
them from their houses. Mandela Park resembled a war zone with hundreds of security forces 
on the streets while police armoured tanks and support vehicles cordoned off certain streets 
and began evicting people from their houses one street at a time (Ntanyana, personal 
communication, 4 March 2007).  
 
But as ANC security forces continued their assault on a poor and defenceless people, Mandela 
Park residents bravely stood up against the might of the State and began to return people to 
their houses. Violent clashes broke out between security personnel and community members. 
The entire community stood up and were supported by neighbouring townships in their 
struggles against evictions. The whole resistance evolved spontaneously out of sympathy with 
evicted neighbours, family members, friends, and in some cases, even complete strangers. 
The air was filled with teargas and police assaulted people with dogs, rubber bullets and 
batons and many people were rushed to hospital with injuries. In the end, only a group of 
thirteen people was evicted by the police on that day but the activists later returned most of 
them to their homes (Fonky, personal communication, 4 March 2007).  
 
It was at this point that Mandela Park activists, with the help of some unionists among them, 
facilitated contact with the WCAEC in Tafelsig (Mackay, 2002:1). Together with the Anti-
Privatisation Forum, they later forged links with the AEC in Mfuleni, Tambo Square, Delft, 
Gugulethu, Valhalla Park, Athlone and KTC. Thus, the MPAEC was born.  
 
4.5 The revolt begins 
Long-standing problems such as service disconnections and bank-promoted evictions 
prompted the formation of the Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign in late 2000. The 
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construction of houses commenced in Mandela Park in 1986 and the first occupants moved in, 
in 1988 (Leitch, 2003:58). New occupants only had to pay a R500 deposit to get a house but 
before long, they discovered that their new houses had a range of problems and most of them 
were not complete units. Some of the houses had no ceiling, no plaster or ventilation holes, 
cracks, no ventilation, etc. The new houses each had only one entrance door and the court 
yards were very small since the banks constructed more than one house on a single plot.  With 
the exception of a few houses whose owners reconstructed at their own expense, many of the 
initial construction problems still persist in the houses today. Residents decided to resume 
bond payments only once the construction deficits had been resolved by the banks (Ntanyana, 
personal communication, 4 March 2007).  
 
In line with the general rent and service boycotts of the early 1990s, which was a key anti-
apartheid strategy of the ANC, the residents of Mandela Park refused to pay their bonds.  
However, SANCO and the ANC later facilitated talks with the banks but these resulted in 
failure. Following the failure of the talks with the banks, a housing taskforce was formed 
which was made up of all the role players including SANCO, SACP and the ANC (Alexander 
2004:65).  Although the task force promised to redress the people’s demands, the uncertainty 
about the amount payable on their bonds continued. The initial value of the houses was R25 
000 but in many instances, the prices soared to R100 000 as a result of inflation. The 
taskforce decided that Mandela Park houses needed to be evaluated so it employed 
fieldworkers who were paid R2500 a month for the exercise. Many times SANCO would call 
a meeting to discuss the housing issue. Initially, the feedback meetings were scenes of heated 
exchanges between the various parties; eventually things calmed down but the interactive 
atmosphere of the meetings disappeared. In later meetings, no housing issue would be on the 
agenda when people arrived at meetings. People would soon become irritable and leave 
because only petty items were being discussed. When only a handful of people remained to 
agree or disagree, housing issues would be discussed under ‘general items’. Eventually, the 
residents began boycotting these gatherings (Samuels, personal communication, 14 June 
2007). 
 
Again, many residents were instructed to pay their bonds with Khayelethu Home Loans 
(KHL) even though they had been paying for a long time at Standard bank or FNB bank. 
However, some others continued to pay to ABSA, African Bank, NEDCOR, FNB, Standard 
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bank and NBS. This also created some problems. A writing regarding the signing of a ‘Joint 
Co-operation Agreement’ between Khayelethu Home Loans and SANCO was distributed by 
the two parties in 1996. It obliged all residents to pay their bonds or face legal action. It was 
later revealed that SANCO’s signed the agreement with KHL because it had accepted a 20% 
stake in the company (Fonky, personal communication, 4 March 2007). And so the watchdog 
organisation of the poor, initially established to strengthen the voice of the poor, became 
swallowed by the logic of profit and it turned its back on the people it was supposed to 
represent by becoming a part of the bank itself. 
 
In 1994 the new ANC government signed a ‘memorandum of understanding’ with the 
commercial banks (Leitch, 2003:60). This move resulted in the formation of SERVCON in 
1995 to address the ‘historical problems’ of arrears and incomplete housing in Mandela Park 
and it was jointly owned by both the banks and the government. In accordance with the   
SERVCON agreement, people were offered four options namely evictions, buybacks, rental 
or right-sizing. The community opposed all these options since they favoured only the banks 
but SERVCON maintained that people would be evicted if they refused to find methods to 
pay. Meanwhile, what the banks demanded was impossible for the poor to meet since the 
situation was complicated by arrears that have built up over the years. In addition, the houses 
originally cost R25 000 but the value had become inflated by high interest rates in recent 
years.  
 
Ward councillors of the ANC joined the housing talks shortly after the first evictions of 
September 1999 and promised the resolution of the housing issue on the condition that 
residents pay their bonds. However, residents felt that even the ward councillors were not 
listening to their complaints.  The ward councillors organised small workshops attended only 
by SANCO officials and a handful of other individuals. Deliberations revolved around the 
SERVCON briefing document of March 1998 which states that the disabled and the elderly 
should not be relocated therefore, the workshops targeted vulnerable people such as single 
mothers, the disabled and pensioners in Mandela Park, many of who got ‘right-sized’ or 
evicted. Representatives of the ANC alliance intimidated the councillors and this resulted in 
low votes for the ANC during the 2000 local government elections in Khayelitsha (Ntanyana, 
personal communication, 4 March 2007).  
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According to Alexander (2004:67), evictions started in earnest during the period following the 
local government elections in 2000. People became confused and demotivated, unwilling to 
engage in endless resistance. About 190 households were evicted as ANC security forces 
continued to relocate residents to remote areas such as Makhaza or Harare, far away from 
Mandela Park (Alexander, 2004:67). By 2001, security personnel evicted more than thirty 
families in a single day. Many Mandela Park residents witnessed their houses going under the 
hammer as commercial banks auctioned them even before families could be re-allocated to 
smaller RDP houses. In some instances, banks continued to demand payment on the original 
bonds irrespective of whether the people had been ‘right-sized’ or evicted.     
 
On 8 July 2002 security police began to confiscate poor people’s property and disconnecting 
electricity and water. As security personnel moved from one dwelling to the other, they 
barged into a house of a woman whose water bill was R800 in arrears. They wanted to 
repossess her furniture but on entering the house, the only items found were some old clothes 
and a torn mattress on the floor. They took all the clothes. Mandela Park residents clashed 
with the police and began to protest outside on the streets. Rubber bullets and teargas flew all 
over the streets. In one incident a rubber bullet penetrated a broken window and hit a three 
month-old infant on his bed. He died instantly. Ten arrests were made and many others were 
detained overnight in police custody at Khayelitsha and elsewhere. They were humiliated, 
cursed, called kaffirs and denied medical treatment for injuries (Zabalaza, personal 
communication, 15 April 2007).   
 
Subsequently, the MPAEC decided to expand its focus beyond the housing issue. Poor people 
simply cannot afford service payments no matter how hard they try and that is the reason they 
are behind in payments. Based on this realisation, a flat rate service charge of R10 a month 
per family, payable to the council, was advocated by the MPAEC.  In this regard, MPAEC 
members staged a sit-in protest at the Khayelitsha Municipal offices in April 2002 and 
demanded an end to service disconnections as well as a R10 per month service charge. In the 
meantime, the Municipal Council also promised to re-install the electricity meters that they 
removed after MPAEC members marched to their offices in November 2002. As municipal 
official Phumzile Mbete explains:  
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“People are experiencing the same problems with regard to electricity. These problems are 
also being taken care of by the MPAEC. People can simply not afford to pay and they build 
up arrears. The MPAEC then popularised a call for a flat rate service charge of R10 a month 
and members started paying just that amount. This happened during a sit-in at the 
Khayelitsha Municipal offices organised by the MPAEC in protest against service cut-offs. 
The council also agreed in August 2002 to install the electricity boxes that were taken out by 
them. People were returned to their original houses from March 2002” (personal 
communication, 14 June 2007)  
 
After the NNP/ANC coalition government assumed power in Cape Town in 2001, the 
MPAEC continued to write to the Ministry of Housing and the banks (Leitch, 2003:61). When 
they got no positive response, the people further launched direct actions. A sit-in protest at the 
NBS in the Cape Town city centre by some 250 MPAEC members followed on 30 May 2002 
to complain about the ‘right-sizing’ of vulnerable people. The majority of the people who 
participated in the sit-in action were to be evicted in the week that followed. They were to 
repay their bonds at a rate of R500 per month and their situation was quite desperate as their 
only income was their pension of R540 a month. Other complaints revolved around the fact 
that occupants had to repair cracks, faulty electrical wiring, and leaking roofs and fit ceilings 
at their own expense. The small sizes of the plots and the re-sale of Mandela Park land to the 
government were also among issues that were raised (Leitch, 2003:60).  
 
Some 200 MPEAC members staged another sit-in protest at the KHL offices on 12 June 2002. 
During this protest, the MPAEC showed video footage of their struggles against evictions and 
the conditions of the houses to the manager of KHL. They demanded the reduction of house 
prices as well as the scrapping of arrears. Although KHL agreed to end the eviction of the 
disabled and the elderly and to scrap the arrears, most other commercial banks continued to 
charge people for arrears (Fonky, personal communication, 4 March 2007). 
 
In a move that was largely regarded as an attempt to stop poor people from defending 
themselves against State oppression, commercial banks secured a court interdict against the 
MPAEC (Leitch, 2003:62). Because of the severe scarcity of funds to launch a legal defence, 
the interdict went unopposed. The terms of the interdict restrained the respondents from 
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encouraging or inducing any person to occupy property and from directly or indirectly 
preventing evictions. Following the interdict, many MPAEC activists were detained and 
incarcerated without trial for lengthy periods in various South African jails.  
 
Since the inception of the Western Cape ANC/NNP coalition government in 2001, provincial 
Housing Minister, Nomatyala Hangana received numerous letters from the MPAEC inviting 
her to visit the area and to discuss the housing issue with the banks and SERVCON (Leitch, 
2003:61). She declined.  
  
“What the MPAEC wanted from the government was that they should pay a subsidy to people 
in Mandela Park and elsewhere buying houses for the first time (sic) and to buy back the land 
on which Mandela Park is constructed in order to develop it. This expectation was however a 
reasonable one – that low-income group housing be subsidized by the state” (Samuels, 
personal communication, 14 June 2007). 
 
In mid-2002, scores of MPAEC activists marched to the Ministry of Housing in the Cape 
Town city centre. They demanded to be addressed by Nomatyala Hangana, the provincial 
MEC for Housing. Nomatyala disappeared and instead, MPAEC supporters were informed 
that the Managing Director of SERVCON would address them. Meanwhile a police 
contingency was dispatched to the scene and it cordoned off the area, used teargas and batons 
to disperse the crowd and made numerous arrests.  Among the detainees were children and 
pensioners. Many of them were later released on condition that they would never show up at 
the ministry again.  MPAEC activist, Goboza Fonky explains that: 
 
“Nomatyala Hlangana, the Western Cape MEC for Housing have (sic) received numerous 
letters from us. We have invited her to Mandela Park but our invitations have been turned 
down by her office. A delegation of MPAEC activists were dispatched to Radio Zibonele on 
Wednesday 4 July, because we learned from reliable sources she would be interviewed that 
night.  She was on the air with a few of us and accepted our invitation to talk to the MPAEC 
but later refused to meet with us. However she decided to arrange a meeting in Mandela Park 
only with the ANC, SACP, COSATU, and SANCO. She said the majority of people can’t think 
and it is them (the organisations) who knew everything (sic). We disagreed because 
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everybody can think. Hundreds of MPAEC supporters marched to her office in Whale Street 
as a result of her exclusion of the real affected people (sic from attending the meeting she had 
with the organisations. Officials told us that SERVCON’s Managing Director would address 
us. Instead, the building got surrounded by police who (sic) dispersed us with teargas and 
arrested 44 of us” (personal communication, 4 March 2007).   
 
Moreover, the National Department of Housing dispatched a delegation to Mandela Park in 
mid-2002 (WCAEC, 2003b:01). The delegation attended the two-weekly gathering of the 
MPAEC in Khayelitsha and promised to discuss the people’s complaints with the national 
ministry. This promise never materialised since no word was ever heard from the National 
Housing office again.  Most people evicted from their houses in Mandela Park were ‘right-
sized’ to Makhaza. But the banks got more clever and smarter. They contracted private 
security companies to carry out surveillance work on the MPAEC and to guard vacant houses. 
Undercover policemen would often attend MPAEC meetings in civilian clothing and monitor 
and infiltrate the movement (WCAEC, 2003b:1). 
 
Later in 2002, a group of ANC ward councillors gained forceful entry and destroyed the doors 
of homes of people that were ‘right-sized’ to Makhaza and evicted them from their houses. 
MPAEC activists alerted the police and several arrests followed but suddenly all charges 
against the councillors were thrown out. Some activists allege that the councillors were paid 
by their friends to allocate those houses to them (Zabalaza, personal communication, 15th 
April 2007).  
According to Kistner (2002:103), the MPAEC and the APF held a rally on 26 October 2002, 
the same day on which the ANC held a rally in Khayelitsha. The MPAEC could only afford 
six buses to transport people but the gathering was attended by more than 6000 people. The 
ANC on the other hand, forked out a lot of money for twelve buses with loudspeakers and had 
the popular Jacob Zuma as the main speaker but only few people attended. The zero 
attendance at the ANC rally made national headlines on television news that night. The ANC 
blamed it on the soccer game played between Sundown and Pirates on that day but failed to 
acknowledge the massive attendance at the MPAEC and APF rally. Max Ntanyana comments 
thus: 
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“You see, party politics is one thing that people are not interested in. Real ‘bread and butter’ 
politics is what the people want. Every day we are getting stronger and stronger. It seems as 
if the authorities have a continuous programme to harass us, especially after we were 
arrested” (personal communication, 17 April 2007). 
   
And so the activities of the MPAEC and the events that unfolded on 26 October 2002 
facilitated the final nail into the coffin of the SACP-ANC establishment in Mandela Park. 
The MPAEC enjoyed positive coverage on television and with the press in general, until this 
point. However, this favourable media coverage ended on 8 November 2002 with a headline 
on the front page of the Cape Times captioned, ‘Home Owners now Targeted by Champions 
of the Poor’. Another headline on the same page read, ‘Felicia’s Title Deeds not a Deterrent to 
Eviction Bullies’ (Sanders, 2002:1).   
 
The article painted a negative picture of the AEC as becoming ‘evictors’ themselves (Sanders, 
2002:1). The report lashed out at the MPAEC and accused them of acting like representatives 
of government by evicting people and allocating houses to others and stated that Lennit Max, 
the Western Cape Police Commissioner, was instructed by Leonard Ramatlakane to come 
down hard on the organisation and to restore order to Khayelitsha (2002:1). Nevertheless, 
Risimati Shivuri, the Khayelitsha police commissioner disagrees: 
 
“What is needed in Khayelitsha is political intervention; arrests will not solve the problem. In 
terms of listening to the people and negotiating with them, this political intervention never 
materialised until this day (sic)” (personal communication, 17 April 2007).   
 
A domestic worker, Felicia Petani, is the person mentioned in the second headline (Sanders, 
2002:1). Her instant popularity arose from the fact that she held the title deeds to a house in 
Mandela Park, which was bought from the banks by Tanja Truscott, her employer. The bank 
had re-possessed the house and sold it to her employer but the MPAEC returned the former 
owner to the house. According to Tanja Truscott, the previous owner of the house had applied 
in 1991 to be ‘right-sized’ by the banks. But Ntanyana disagrees with Truscott:  
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 “The fact of the matter is that the idea of ‘right–sizing’ was not even existent in 1991 and 
nobody was ‘right-sized’ then! It was not until 1999 that the first evictions took place in 
Mandela Park and ‘right-sizing’ only happened in 2001” (personal communication, 17 April 
2007).                                                                                                       
 
Tanja Truscott also claimed that the house was empty for many years before she bought it 
(Sanders, 2002:1). This claim is also refuted: 
                    
“If Tanja Truscott only knew Khayelitsha she would be aware that no house will stand empty 
(sic) for ten years and not be vandalised in this township, the story can simply not be true. 
However, the truth is that the MPAEC returned the original owner to his house after being 
evicted for ten weeks only and not ten years”   (Ntanyana, personal communication, 17 April 
2007). 
 
The MPAEC also denied Tanja Truscott’s claim that people were evicted momentarily 
without prior notice by the MPAEC and that that was not the case even with Felicia. They 
claimed that they assisted new owners to find alternative accommodation after they have 
agreed to move out and that nobody was evicted without being given an alternative place to 
stay.  MPAEC activist, Goboza Fonky explains this point: 
  
“In most instances, the banks decided to sell-off these houses mercilessly and without 
consideration, so that they could ensure title deeds for the new occupants. We wanted the 
evicted families to return to their original houses, so we approached the new owners (some of 
them even soldiers and police men) and they agreed to move out. With the assistance of other 
MPAEC activists, these people were relocated to other vacant houses that were sometimes 
protected by private security companies contracted by the banks. Alternative accommodation 
was given to everyone, and not a single family was left without a place to stay” (personal 
communication, 4 March 2007).  
 
Whatever the merits of the case, SERVCON’s decision to sell-off houses that were still under 
dispute to new owners remains unethical and irresponsible.  
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The MPAEC called a mass meeting in Mandela Park on 8 December 2002 that was attended 
by both SANCO and the local councillors (Leitch, 2003:62). Leonard Ramatlakane who also 
attended the meeting, refused to talk when the people demanded to be addressed by him. The 
people became angry and started throwing chairs while Councillor Mbongeni Ngombane 
accused the MPAEC of high-jacking the meeting and claimed that the Mandela Park residents 
wanted to resume their bond payments. The meeting was postponed to an alternative venue 
outside Mandela Park but only a handful of people, including Ramatlakane, the councillors 
and their allies attended the meeting. Meanwhile, outside the venue, hundreds of MPAEC 
activists chanted slogans and ‘toy-toyed’2 in protest against the ANC and its leadership. 
Ramatlakane decided to use strong-arm tactics. He condemned the MPAEC for simply 
showing up at the houses of new owners, instructing them to leave and calling for the arrest of 
such individuals and the protection of people with title deeds.  
                                      
What the MPAEC found disturbing was the fact that the SACP, COSATU, the ANC and 
SANCO were embraced and acknowledged by communities in the face of   government’s 
unwillingness to engage them in dialogue. The MPAEC viewed these organisations as being 
on the side of the banks and as having no concern in the matter. They believe that both the 
SACP and COSATU were supposed to be actively supporting the community struggles but 
they refused to. The fact that they are in alliance with government does not give them 
legitimacy to attend these community meetings; their attendance at such meetings appear to 
be only in support of government and the banks.  SANCO on the other hand should also not 
attend these community meetings since they are on the side of the banks as a result of their 
shareholding in KHL. 
 
4.6 The Quest for Education 
In an attempt to reach beyond defensive battles, the MPAEC took a bold initiative to open a 
community run school. The People’s Power Secondary School was launched by the MPAEC 
in January 2003 and consisted mainly of pupils who were turned away from other schools for 
various reasons including issues pertaining to school-going age, school fees and failure of 
                  
2 ‘Toy-toy’ is a South African term for a non-violent march accompanied by 
freedom songs and chants. 
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examinations. The school recruited twenty-eight unemployed teachers on a voluntary basis 
during its first year of existence and enrolled 1800 learners from all over Khayelitsha. In 
February 2003, the MPAEC engaged in several talks with the Western Cape Department of 
Education (WCED) over the registration of the school (Mc Farlane, 2003:1). 
  
According to McFarlane (2003:1), many South African learners were excluded from public 
schools because of issues relating to school uniform, transportation and school fees. He 
comments further that such creative community initiatives must not be undermined but rather, 
unleashed, tapped and encouraged.  
                                                                           
The acting director of the Education Policy Unit at Witwatersrand University, Salim Vally, 
stated that many South African learners’ rights are being violated on a daily basis throughout 
the country because of the State’s continued review of South Africa’s education finance 
policies. The Education Rights Project (ERP) described the Khayelitsha initiative as a striking 
demand for justice and encouraged people to take the initiative in addressing the country’s 
backlog in schools.    
 
As negotiations with the WCED to register the school became more and more protracted, the 
MPAEC decided to step up its pressure on the institution. Hundreds of students organised by 
the MPAEC marched to the offices of the WCED in Kuils River in May 2003 in a mass 
demonstration outside the WCED building. As a consequence, the WCED initially decided to 
allow the school. However, the WCED officials suddenly changed their minds in August 
2003, closed down the school and refused its registration. The volunteer teachers were refused 
employment and most of the learners were not granted admission to other public schools 
except for eight primary school students who were absorbed by a neighbouring school. In 
spite having met all the registration requirements, the WCED proceeded with the closing of 
the school and all the learners were forced to sit at home (Ndabazandile, personal 
communication, 17 April 2007). 
 
Chris Ndabazandile also accused the ANC of playing unconstitutional games with them and 
that the reason the school was closed down was because the ANC did not want it. 
Ndabazandile was abducted by security officials in September 2003 and held in custody at a 
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police station in Side B. During his custody, he was called a ‘kaffir’ and was racially abused 
(Ndabazandile, personal communication, 17 April 2007).  
 
Similarly, a week after the closure of the People’s Power Secondary School by the WCED, a 
group of five MPAEC activists including Max Ntanyana, the chairperson of the MPAEC, 
were arrested for breaking their bail conditions and for intimidation (Leitch, 2003:63).  
Minutes after an MPAEC meeting, a black car without number plates had stopped outside 
Ntanyana’s house and three men in civil uniform jumped out of it and abducted Ntanyana. . 
The MPAEC believed the police used Ntanyana as a scapegoat. Ntanyana was detained for 
several months at Pollsmoor prison and was released on strict apartheid-style bail conditions. 
The MPAEC referred the issue to the Freedom of Expression Institute as they regarded the 
bail conditions as unconstitutional.  The MPAEC believed the arrests came were due to the 
positive image the school enjoyed in the media. Lennit Max, Western Cape Police 
Commissioner later admitted that undercover police officials infiltrated the regular Sunday 
gatherings of the MPAEC and monitored these proceedings (Leitch, 2003:63). 
 
4.7 Resistance and State Repression 
Both SANCO and ANC leaders had been accorded much deference in the years immediately 
following 1994. They made promises of a ‘better life for all’ and carried the mystique of 
liberation fighters. Nevertheless, the repressive responses to community struggles in addition 
to the magnitude of false and unkept promises made by the ANC would eventually facilitate 
the active erosion of the deference and ultimately give rise to what Miliband (1978:16) refers 
to as ‘desubordination’.                                              
 
Needless to say, the ANC’s disregard for the MPAEC offended many people and the bank-
enforced evictions and police harassment of MPAEC activists caused a great deal of outrage 
within the local community.  Because of the refusal of both the banks and government to view 
the overtures of the community in a serious light, the MPAEC realised that they had to set a 
series of more militant actions in motion (Leitch, 2003:63). Thus, fertile grounds were laid for 
increased mass mobilisation and militancy.  
 
Some activists proposed the burning down of houses that were re-possessed by the banks 
(Leitch,, 2003:63). The MPAEC decided to put the proposal up for debate and called a range 
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of public gatherings with the Mandela Park community. An entirely new strategy was born 
out of these debates. According to activists, the burning down of re-possessed houses would 
be a simultaneous admission of defeat and would be an obviously super-militant strategy. 
Instead, activists decided to employ a more positive tactic by returning evicted families to 
their original houses. The MPAEC thereafter adopted a provocative chant that soon echoed all 
over Mandela Park namely “Seize our homes – seize our lives.” This slogan has earned 
MPAEC members the ferocity of the ANC Government since it inspired people all over 
Khayelitsha and became quite widespread throughout the country.  
 
In another development, SAMWU shop steward, Max Ntanyana worked at sewerage farm 
outside Khayelitsha. He was at the forefront of a strike against privatization at his workplace 
in September 2002. About twenty employees, including Ntanyana, were arrested and held in 
police custody in Somerset West.  By then, Ntanyana had become a household name in the 
Khayelitsha courtroom. A police official seated at the back of the courtroom openly stated 
that the MPAEC was the enemy of the State. Meanwhile, the word ‘terrorist’ was also got 
increasingly used by security personnel and in media circles when referring to the MPAEC 
and its activists.  Ntanyana was subsequently charged with contempt of court and 
intimidation, accused of continuing his activities with MPAEC. He was incarcerated at 
Pollsmoor prison and fired from his job since an interdict prohibiting him from engaging in 
MPAEC activities was still in force (Ntanyana, personal communication, 17 April 2007). 
 
On 9 September 2003 the courts released all the other workers that were in police holding 
cells but Ntanyana was imprisoned at the Pollsmoor Maximum Security Prison (Leitch 2003: 
64). In the aftermath of the September 2003 arrests security police continued their crackdown 
on the MPAEC and arrested Goboza Fonky two weeks after. He was kept in police custody in 
Khayelitsha and released on a bail of R500.  MPAEC chairperson, Max Ntanyana recalls:  
 
“The time in Pollsmoor was tough and terrible. You already expect to be a robbery victim 
once you had a visitor (sic). Inmates are often sodomised; prisoners fight and the warders 
won’t look after you. Phone calls are limited to once a week only. There are, however, other 
inmates who value and respect the work of the MPAEC. And this is how we make it through 
the day. The community supports us tremendously since the court is always packed when we 
have to appear (sic). At one court appearance, authorities wanted to avoid the community and 
made me appear over lunchtime. The prosecutor wanted to refuse me bail and said my lawyer 
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was not present. He ordered me to return to court the next day, but I knew my lawyer was 
there and that they tried to hide me from the community so that I could not see them (sic). But 
the community was there, in their hundreds, singing and protesting outside and inside the 
court. There were a lot of undercover police, working for the banks. They told me about how 
the evictions and disconnections affected other police also and that I would not be released 
on bail (sic). Support was pouring in (sic) from all over the world including Germany, 
America, Italy, Canada and Argentine. I stopped being worried since I was very enlightened 
and empowered by the support. In fact the arrests and the crack down on social movements 
diverted my worries from myself unto the movement and the community. We were released on 
strict bail conditions” (personal communication, 17 April 2007).   
 
The interfaces between repression and resistance gained momentum and the rhythms of 
contestation became faster. On 31 July 2003 three families were evicted from their houses 
when the sheriffs descended to the community under heavy police escort. Meanwhile, the 
week before that, the police and the sheriffs evicted a total of seven households in Illitha Park 
in only one street. The MPAEC returned all these families to their houses on the same day 
they were evicted. On 7 August 2003 another group of families was evicted by the sheriffs but 
again, in all these cases, the MPAEC reversed the evictions the same day (Zabalaza, personal 
communication, 15 April 2007).  
 
In the aftermath of the August 2003 evictions, several incidents occurred. Mandela Park’s 
young men decided to strike back and started targeting delivery vans and stoning police 
vehicles on Khayelitsha’s streets. However, the police was not deterred by this display of 
rage. Again, a woman, who owed the council water bill, lost all her possessions when police 
re-possessed her belongings only a week after the stoning of commercial vehicles in Mandela 
Park. The police also targeted, disrupted and dispersed MPAEC’s regular Sunday (Fonky, 
personal communication, 4 March 2007). The pressure of that period was spelt out in an 
MPAEC press statement dated 28 September 2003: 
  
“The police repression is ongoing. Six of our comrades remain incarcerated since 12 June 
2003 for illegally occupying houses. The MPAEC must foot a legal bill of R2500 for hiring a 
lawyer to defend these comrades. It is anticipated that the legal bill will increase sharply in 
the near future and the next court appearance is tomorrow. In order to pay these bills, the 
MPAEC has set up a legal defence fund as well as a bail fund and is desperately asking for 
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donations. It is also anticipated that pressure on the MPAEC will intensify as the 2004 
elections draw closer. The ANC is always banking on Khayelitsha votes because the Western 
Cape is a strongly contested province. To ensure that their support base remains intact, they 
would want to eliminate the MPAEC and opposition social movements” (WCAEC, 2003a:1). 
 
The repression and marginalisation of community movements continued unabated. Sanki 
Mthembi-Makhanyele, Deputy Secretary General of the ANC, responded to a question 
regarding the MPAEC at a Socio-Economic Rights Conference in August 2003. He stated that 
South Africa could not afford behaviours similar to those of societies that have been 
independent for many years because our democracy is very young and he therefore expects 
the people to move in the same direction. He also mentioned that the State would differentiate 
between problematic and positive social formations (Barnard & Farred, 2004:62). Meanwhile, 
David Makhura, the General Secretary of the Gauteng ANC, launched a direct attack on 
social movements in the same week and branded them as ‘ultra-revolutionaries’ who oppose 
evictions and disconnections. He went on with his attack on social formations and stated that, 
“Si zo ba bethwa!” (We will hit them); (Barnard & Farred, 2004:62). 
 
4.8 Year of Action 
The following represents the content of a leaflet, which was circulated in January 2004 by the 
MPAEC at railway stations and taxi ranks throughout Khayelitsha (Barnard & Farred, 
2004:63).  
 
"The African National Congress has governed the country for more than a decade promising 
a better life for all. Instead, the working class have (sic) been exploited for the advancement 
of private sector profit. A lot of black elites have joined the rich man’s club and became (sic) 
instant millionaires. But between 1996 and 2000, black African people’s average income has 
dropped from R32000 to R26000. According to a recent study, half of Khayelitsha’s 
households are subjected to starvation level poverty (sic) since they survive on less than R167 
a month. The ANC initially promised free and compulsory education but learners are refused 
schooling and others are forced to pay unaffordable amounts as school fees. School 
principals need to exempt poor families from school fees and should not act as gatekeepers 
(sic). 
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There is not a single trace of the ‘decent housing for all’, promised by the ANC – instead the 
country is experiencing a big housing backlog. An amount of R337 million earmarked for 
housing delivery in the Western Cape could not be spend (sic) and was returned to treasury in 
November 2003. On 29 January the MPAEC will be meeting with the Western Cape Housing 
MEC to discuss the issue of housing subsidies. The 50kw free electricity promised by the ANC 
for so long have (sic) at last reached our people. This was partly because of the mobilisation 
of the MPAEC and its antagonism towards (sic) the electricity company Phambili Nambane. 
Under the ANC government, the economy shed more than one million jobs (sic). And in 
Shoprite and Score supermarkets, only those with ANC connections get hired (sic). The 
distribution of jobs must be done in a fair manner.  
 
Thabo Mbeki now admits there are problems because the elections are around the corner. He 
is again making promises about a social contract with the people and is promising more 
delivery. This is in actual terms an invitation to assist him in maximising private sector 
profitability and capitalism. The SANCO leaders, the councillors and the local ANC have 
repressed and harassed us while the national ANC government kept quiet (sic). The eviction 
of people by SERVCON must be stopped!  The bail conditions of some are reminiscent of the 
apartheid era; they are under house arrest and are not allowed to attend public meetings. 
There is no free political activity in South Africa and our constitutional rights have been 
violated. 
 It is only the interest of capitalism and the rich that is being served by this ANC government 
(sic). There is no policy being put forward by political parties that are in the interest of the 
poor. Therefore we see no meaning for us in the forthcoming provincial and national 
elections. The MPAEC herewith encourages its supporters to refrain from participating in the 
forthcoming elections only to enhance capitalism’s democracy. 
           
The year 2004 is a year of action for us in the MPAEC and we will broaden our struggle:   
• For democratic, human, and socio-economic rights! 
• For dropping all charges and bail conditions! 
• For an end to arrests and police harassment! 
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• For a flat rate service charge of R10! 
• For enforcing the 6kl free water promised by the ANC! 
• To resist all electricity and water cut-offs as well as evictions! 
 
Add your demands by attending our bi-weekly meetings at 19H00 (Wednesdays) and 14H00 
(Sundays) in the Andile Nhose Centre.  
Phambili socialism! Phambili the AEC! (Forward with socialism, Forward with the AEC) 
Phantsi capitalism! Phantsi the banks! (Down with capitalism, down with the banks)” 
  
Conclusion 
Most of South Africa's new social movements (and the poor who make-up those movements) 
have, unsurprisingly, exhibited little desire to be part of the institutionalised mainstream 
South African politics. This is precisely because these movements have been born out of the 
very failures and betrayals of South Africa's main political 'currents' and the institutional 
democratic framework that give them contemporary legitimacy. In many poor urban and rural 
communities, it is through the activities of new social movements that an increasing number 
of people experience and practise meaningful democracy. Indeed, it is no co-incidence that 
the growing impact and popularity of the daily 'bread and butter' issues and struggles taken up 
by the social movements, are directly linked to the adverse effects of the ANC State's neo-
liberal policies on the poor majority that are most acutely experienced through the 'offices' of 
the various institutional mechanisms of representative democracy. 
The fact that most social movements are presently outside the mainstream of South Africa's 
institutional political framework is representative of a reality that the ANC State and its allies 
appear wholly unwilling to face - that is, that an increasing number of poor South Africans no 
longer see active participation in the present institutional set-up of representative democracy 
as being in their political and/or socio-economic interests. 
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CHAPTER 5 - Research Findings and Analysis 
Introduction 
This section   summarises the narrative of the conflict that has characterised the relationship 
between the State and community-based social movements resisting the effects of neo-
liberalism. The first part of this chapter attempts to chart the contours of the State's response 
to new social movements in relation to the country's macro-economic framework. The next 
section identifies the points of contact between the State and community movements in 
relation to the demands made by movements, and the State’s response to these demands. 
From this point, an analysis of the effects of the conflict on the relationship between the State 
and communities in struggle is provided, as well as the possible consequences of the current 
trajectory. The final part examines the ways in which the conflict has affected the 
communities and the movements themselves and also details the research findings. 
 
5.1 Managing Dissent through Public-Private-Partnerships 
In Mandela Park, the various arms of national and local government have formed an 
important collaborative pact consisting of the private sector (e.g. corporate land-owners, 
banks and private security firms), the judiciary, intelligence services, police, government 
parastatals, local sub-contractors, housing departments etc. This strategic approach points 
towards important developments on how the activities of social movements will be controlled 
by the State in the future. In Mandela Park, a township, where conflict levels have sky-
rocketed, the shape of the Public Private Partnerships (PPP) became particularly significant 
for the ANC State. 
 
Between 2002 and 2003, a strategic partnership was built against the MPAEC in Mandela 
Park. While a sizeable section of the community engaged in ongoing resistance on evictions, a 
collaborative pact consisting of representatives of private banks, SERVCON, local police and 
the State prosecutor was formed. SANCO chairperson, Sidaki Thembalihle explains that: 
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“There was a regular monthly meeting between key players namely the councillors, attorneys 
acting on behalf of the banks, the police, and SERVCON, because the issue only escalated 
further and further” (personal communication, 14 April 2007).    
 
The study discovered that the MPAEC was both monitored and infiltrated by this PPP ‘pact’. 
The police superintendent in Khayelitsha also admitted that MPAEC meetings were regularly 
attended by undercover policemen in civilian clothing. 
  
From the minutes of its meetings between 2003 and April 2004, it has been established that 
SERVCON has maintained contact with the office of the state prosecutor. In these minutes, 
numerous discussions were held with the local prosecutor regarding criminal cases before the 
Khayelitsha court. The minutes also indicate that the prosecutor’s office gave SERVCON the 
undertaking that they would first consult them before withdrawing any case against the 
MPAEC.  Minutes of another meeting also showed that SERVCON was in possession of 
classified information regarding MPAEC plans and deliberations. A private security firm 
based in Khayelitsha was contracted by SERVCON to collect intelligence reports and carry 
out surveillance against MPAEC activists and their activities. Even ordinary members of the 
community were recruited and put on SERVCON’s payroll to spy and report on their 
neighbours.  
 
It is clear that the notion of the ‘independence of the judiciary’ is greatly undermined in the 
light of these revelations about the form and nature of these partnerships.  Moreover, the 
ANC’s refusal to engage in dialogue with social movements resulted in irregularities. 
Meanwhile, social movements became increasingly antagonistic as the ANC continued the 
deployment of its repressive apparatus against them. 
 
5.2 The Rule of Law 
Engagements between the State and communities have been characterised by high levels of 
conflict. This was mostly because of the government’s refusal to negotiate with civil society 
about its economic policy. This reality is reflected in the government’s response against 
communities that resisted the effects of GEAR. Moreover, the focus of social movement 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 78
antagonism was primarily aimed at State service providers, the council, the banks and the 
police. 
  
Meanwhile, community perceptions regarding the State’s response to resistance have been 
profoundly influenced by the government’s hiring of private security companies. In many 
cases, the metro police and the public order policing unit presided over the protests in 
Mandela Park. However, as indicated in this study, many cost recovery operations and large-
scale evictions that anticipated strong community resistance increasingly utilised specialised 
private security companies. The emergence of the private sector in state-community relations 
dramatically reshaped the character of conflict as demonstrated by the bank’s efforts to 
prevent evicted people from being returned to their original houses by appointing private 
security companies to safeguard property.  
 
Serious questions are being asked concerning the prioritisation of private sector profitability 
versus the status of citizen’s political and civil rights because of the increasing involvement of 
‘business’ in the management of community protest and resistance. The conflict in Mandela 
Park was also influenced by the important role that the courts played. Often, the courts have 
taken disciplinary actions against social movements but occasionally, the movements have 
been able to seek relief through the courts. Moreover, the courts and the judiciary as a whole 
have presided over the plethora of charges brought against MPAEC activists in Mandela Park, 
the prosecution of trespassers and the granting of interdicts and eviction orders.  
 
It has also been reported that the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) gathers information 
pertaining to social movement activities (WCAEC, 2003a:1). NIA’s activities ranged from 
accusations of intimidation and harassment to accusations of interrogation to obtain 
information. The head of the information centre at the NIA, Jackie McKay, did not want to 
admit openly that social movements were targeted by the NIA. He however admitted that in 
the event of organised social movement activity, the NIA pays close attention to individuals 
involved since such activities could create the impression of being oppositional to the law. He 
revealed that the potential for unrest as a consequence of social movement activity is currently 
the one factor that threatens national security the most. He denied that the work of the NIA 
included the daily surveillance and monitoring of community movements but suggested that 
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the NIA often forwarded information collected for policy purposes to national government 
(Jackie McKay, personal communication, 4 March, 2007).  
 
In the course of the conflict between the State and the community over the effects of the 
ANC’s macro-economic path, the structures of the ANC alliance contributed immensely to 
the maintenance of the present status quo as demonstrated by the Mandela Park situation. 
According to Fikile Ngombane, an ANC ward councillor, the ANC launched a branch of 
SANCO in Mandela Park, which served as an effective measure to control the mass action in 
the township:  
 
“The people did not want any other structure in Mandela Park apart from the MPAEC. We 
however pushed through and established a SANCO branch in the area, as it did not exist 
before. So SANCO was launched and has called mass meetings on every Sunday, which was 
very well attended (sic). This serves as an effective weapon against the MPAEC” (personal 
communication, 14 April 2007).  
 
In Mandela Park, a fatal re-making of the nature of community conflict occurred as 
alternative movements organised by the State such as SANCO facilitated real conflict and 
direct competition amongst local alliance structures and social movements. And in the State-
community conflict in Mandela Park, an important mini turf-war between alliance structures 
and social movements occurred.  
  
5.3 The Effects of Conflict 
Both social movements and communities have experienced far-reaching consequences from 
the ongoing State-community conflict. The perception of communities on South Africa’s new 
democracy, the State and social movements has dramatically changed since the beginning of 
the conflict and the resultant State repression that has often accompanied it. Although it 
cannot be compared to the apartheid period, the resurgence of political conflict holds far-
reaching implications for already traumatised communities such as Mandela Park while 
intensifying the traumatisation and alienation of the most marginalised sections of society.  
The ability of the State to effectively deliver other relevant services such as community 
policing, repairs on council property etc, have been  handicapped by the effects of the 
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ongoing conflict in Mandela Park. Police Superintendent Vosloo expresses his frustration 
over the challenges that the Khayelitsha police faces: 
  
“I am of the opinion that the police can never be the solution to this problem. In addressing 
this, the councillors and those other role players must play a much bigger role. If they want to 
evict people, issue notices, or even to protect the sheriff, they call upon us to do that. The 
people being illegally in the houses (sic) immediately see us as the immediate threat and 
begin fighting with us. This poses an immense problem for us because policing and crime 
prevention is in a broad sense determined by our ability to earn the trust of the community.    
Then the real kind of tasks that we were supposed to perform like (sic) robberies, rapes, and 
murders becomes (sic) difficult and problematic since we have lost their trust. 
 
It’s a situation of taking one step forward and two steps backward. Today, we sit around the 
table and talk to them but tomorrow we come and fight. It is really frustrating because these 
are our communities, our friends and families… and we understand their frustration. And 
then comes the physical confrontation and we must throw our teargas and shoot our rubber 
bullets and stunt grenades. In the end, we must ensure that the court order is carried out. 
There is then a failure on the part of the people to actually understand all of this because we 
were on speaking terms with them only the day before but today we are fighting”  (personal 
communication, 17 April 2007). 
 
Throughout the country, parastatal and council officials are escorted by heavily armed 
security forces when entering these volatile neighbourhoods. And there have been a number 
of police related deaths and shooting incidents, during the execution of these cost recovery 
operations. Meanwhile, the ability of the State to intervene positively in the lives of its 
citizens is seriously undermined by such incidents while the gap between the State and its 
citizens continues to widen. 
 
Social movements have also experienced the negative effects of the conflict and repression. 
The organisational form of the MPAEC in Mandela Park has been severely restructured as a 
result of its decision to employ confrontational tactics that fuelled the escalation of the 
conflict. The MPAEC has adopted the ‘moving back of evicted families to their homes’, as its 
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principal strategy. However, a high level of ongoing mobilisation was required by this 
strategy as it effectively rendered large numbers of people vulnerable to prosecution. On the 
other hand, the State also had to ensure that other communities facing similar challenges do 
not follow the Mandela Park route.  A SERVCON member, Martin Bungu explains further: 
  
“In fact, the MPAEC currently employs a defensive strategy and most of their energies (sic) 
have been occupied by these court cases over the last three years or so. They’ve not been 
thinking ahead of issues and have been fighting reactive battles” (personal communication, 
17 April 2007). 
 
The perception of social movements regarding organisational cohesiveness and priorities has 
also changed as a result of the high levels of conflict and repression. The particular priorities 
and constraints of the conflictual context have shaped the forms of organisational 
reproduction. The mobilisation of resources to defend the legal battles of its activists as a 
result of the State’s ongoing crackdown on the activists has almost exclusively captured the 
focus of the MPAEC. This reality was increasingly reflected in the press statements and 
mobilisations of the MPAEC. As a result, the MPAEC experienced a deficit in the vital 
activities necessary for strategic direction and sustained mobilisation. Instead of extending its 
membership base and assuming greater political space within the community, the MPAEC’s 
strategic thrust was captured by the legal defence of its members from Ramatlakane’s law and 
order crackdown.   
 
The modus operandi of a movement as well as the nature of people involved is, to a large 
extent, determined by its choice of tactics.  For instance, to block out the possibility of being 
infiltrated by spies, movements that employ direct violent confrontation as a strategy would 
most likely be controlled and steered by a small number of trusted individuals. There would 
most likely also be an alteration in terms of the positions and responsibilities held by 
members of the core group. The position of women in social movements is of particular 
relevance here. And in contexts characterised by high levels of violence and conflict, this 
problem can even be more exacerbated and more common. The role of women becomes 
increasingly secondary while those of men are jealously protected and highly regarded. The 
common threat of re-possession has however acted as the central catalyst in the formation of 
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inter-provincial networks between social movements. Both nationally and internationally, 
individual movements managed to access the greatest level of practical solidarity in this area 
(Alexander, 2004:67).  
 
In another important development, national discussions focussing on the development of 
systems for mutual assistance as well as the development of strategies to deal with the effects 
of repression have begun to take place amongst social movements across provinces 
(Alexander, 2004:67).   
        
 5.4 Research Finding 
The above summary of the development and outcomes of the MPAEC has confirmed the 
hypothesis of this study.  Community organizations like the MPAEC can make a significant 
contribution to community empowerment by mobilizing and articulating the voices of the 
poor and vulnerable groups in society to resist the State’s hegemony with regards to service 
cut-offs and household evictions. 
 
Conclusion 
The resurgence of popular grassroots organisations in the form of new social movements 
since 1994 has profoundly altered not only the political landscape of South Africa but 
relations within civil society in general. As this research demonstrates, the antagonism 
between the state and social movements, a direct result of the adoption of neo-liberal 
strategies and policies, has led to increasing levels of conflict around basic socio-economic 
issues. The return of such conflict in the context of a society that has historically experienced 
the trauma of politically motivated violence presents a major challenge to both the social and 
political cohesiveness of South Africa's fragile democracy. 
 
Thus, it is clear that the increased repression of social movements at the hand of the State has 
caused a severe circumscription of people’s socio-economic and political rights as a result of 
the existing political and socio-economic framework.  Instead of disappearing, there will most 
likely be an intensification of the current conflict between community organisations and the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 83
government. Subsequently, it can be foreseen that the South African democracy will be 
dramatically reshaped in the next decade.  
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CHAPTER 6 – Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
This section is divided into two parts, namely conclusions and recommendations. The first 
part provides detailed conclusions of the research report regarding neo-liberalism growth path 
and its negative effects on the South African poor. The second part offers broad and specific 
recommendations pertaining to both government and social movements. The section also 
provides policy alternatives as well as general recommendations. 
 
6.1.1 Neo-liberalism 
There is no doubt that South Africa is following a neo-liberal approach that entrenches the 
privatisation and commodification of basic municipal services. However, will ‘a better life for 
all’ be best attained by the pursuit of such an approach?  
 
• There is still a general reluctance in the market-logic to acknowledge the social 
and cultural value of water but rather to see water only as an economic 
commodity. Policy alternatives should therefore focus on an approach that 
acknowledges access to water as a right and not a privilege.  
• Service disconnections as a result of arrears on water bills constitute another area 
that is justified under the cost recovery logic. A key factor that increases the 
hardship of poor people is the aggressive manner in which cost recovery is 
enforced. When the poor cannot afford to pay for their services, they are faced 
with evictions and service disconnections.  Many people also cannot afford the 
reconnection fees charged by the authorities. Although access to water is a right, 
cost recovery actions present water as a privilege. 
• Economic efficiency is usually the one logic employed to inform the market-based 
approach of cost recovery. As a result, profits and commercial interests are 
prioritised instead of moral and humanitarian considerations. This becomes 
particularly crucial when looking at the allocation of service infrastructure. To the 
detriment of the rural poor, service providers sometimes decide to roll out 
infrastructure only to urban areas because of their greater ability to pay. The 
argument is – if you can pay for it, we will deliver it. In real terms, this translates 
to the fact that poor people are not serviced with water networks because of their 
inability to pay. 
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• There is a false believe about the public sector being more corrupt and less 
efficient than the private sector. The public sector is usually associated with 
lethargy, bureaucracy and inefficiency while there is a tendency to consider 
innovation, flexibility and efficiency as being synonymous with private capital. 
But in the corporate world of water supply, bribery, favouritism and corruption are 
widespread while accountability, transparency and good governance are 
undermined because of the insistence by corporate companies that certain water 
contracts remain secret from the public. If a private service provider becomes 
unaffordable and inefficient, it becomes very difficult for government to withdraw 
from the contract because of the high dispute costs and the long-term nature of 
many of these contracts.  
• Users cannot shop around for a better deal with regards to basic service 
infrastructure and this indicates the existence of a natural monopoly in this area. 
Monopolies have the tendency to disregard public interest, unless government 
regulation is strict. Consumers are subjected to price increments. The market-
based approach usually employs price increments as the best strategy and as a 
financial instrument to reach their stated objectives.  Although environmental and 
social objectives can equally be served through such an instrument, the market-
based approach has very little interest in that. 
• The ability of low-income households to access basic services is also undermined 
by the market-based approach. Because the rich already have an existing service 
infrastructure, they end up paying far less for basic services than the poor who 
must pay for the installation of new ones. Thus, the existing inequalities in South 
Africa are further worsened by all of these factors.  
• Poor people are experiencing all sorts of problems and have been disadvantaged as 
a result of government’s withdrawal from direct service provision. Because the 
market is not distributing basic services equally to all, the developmental needs of 
citizens as well as equity considerations are undermined as the private sector 
becomes less interested in people and their needs than in profits and cost recovery. 
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6.1.2 Social movements 
• The government and the banks have carried out a sustained and vicious attack on 
the MPAEC irrespective of the high praise accorded to South Africa’s Constitution 
(1996). The MPAEC is however resolute that no arrests, police brutality, or 
interdict will cause them to back down. Until they can negotiate for the 
implementation of their demands, they will continue to resist and mobilise.  
• South Africa has made inroads with regards to democracy since the days of 
apartheid. The country boasts of a Constitution (1996) that is widely respected 
throughout the globe. But the ordeals of the Mandela Park community point to the 
fact that the local arms of government are not upholding the Constitution. In the 
light of the ever-increasing antagonism towards the State, these developments 
predict a negative scenario with regards to South Africa’s ability to guarantee the 
Constitutional Rights of its citizens. 
• A vast amount of social movements have developed in South Africa in recent 
years and the MPAEC is only one of them. The MPAEC was also a proud and 
outspoken partner of the Anti-Iraq–War Coalition. 
• It is clear that the 2009 elections will be won by the ANC. However, the serious 
shortcomings in the State’s delivery programme resulted in a vacuum  to the left of 
the ANC, which has been exposed by social movements. 
• It is unlikely that the ANC will be able to please everybody equally, especially 
with regards to unemployment. It is clear that the government will not solve the 
problem of unemployment overnight and as a result, crime will continue to 
manifest prominently in the society. To emphasise the needs of communities on a 
continuous basis, social movements will have to play an incremental role in terms 
of mass mobilisation and direct confrontation. 
• To be able to effectively address the plight of the oppressed, COSATU may need 
to launch a mass workers’ party and the Union Federation needs to break away 
from the ANC alliance urgently. The support, already organised in the form of 
social movements, would be at their immediate disposal if they pursue the 
breakaway route. But COSATU’s reluctance to split from the alliance is well-
known; therefore, the vacuum to the left of the ANC will continue to exist. 
  
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 87
6.2 Recommendations 
The South African political landscape has undergone major alterations since 1994 as a result 
of the resurfacing of popular civil society movements. The adoption of neo-liberal policies 
and strategies has led to increasing levels of conflict between social movements and the 
government. The cohesion of South Africa's fragile democracy is facing a major challenge as 
a result of the resurfacing of previously experienced socio-political conflict. The antagonism 
between the government and civil society organisations is unlikely to end soon. Therefore, 
opportunities for constructive negotiation and dialogue need to be facilitated between the two 
conflicting parties, in order to alter the landscape on which the contestation is taking place. In 
view of these observations, this research offers the following recommendations:  
 
6.2.1 The Government: 
• The government is enjoined to convene a national conference that will focus 
on the ‘right to dissent or the right to a different perspective’ and that will 
involve all the civil society role players and stakeholders. 
• A summit that will focus on the current socio-economic crisis should be 
convened urgently by the national government in order to open up the socio-
economic rights’ debate.  
• Independent organs of State such as the Human Rights Commission should 
conduct progressive ‘socio economic rights’ hearings’ throughout the country 
so that they can evaluate the effects of the state’s cost recovery activities on 
the poor people and its contribution to the current conflict.  
• The State should ensure that social movements are included in government 
structures and ward committees at the local level in an effort to get rid of the 
present exclusivistic and antagonistic tendencies.  
• The state should encourage both Community Development Forums and 
Community Police Forums to consolidate strategies around socio-economic 
dictates and to minimise conflict. In cases where large numbers of people are 
involved, protest can be effectively managed by developing guidelines that 
will help the police to minimise conflict.  
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• There is a need for policies that will focus on non-violent punitive measures, 
the resolution of conflict, and the use of weapons to guide municipal officials 
involved in cost recovery operations.  
• Beyond issues pertaining to the governance of political and socio-economic 
rights, officials involved with criminal justice such as State lawyers, State 
prosecutors, the police, magistrates, etc, should be subjected to specific 
training programmes aimed at equipping them with the relevant skills for 
socio-economic legislation.   
• The constitutionality of involving the private sector in evictions and cost 
recovery operations should be probed through the establishment of an 
investigative commission.  
6.2.2 Social Movements and/ or Community Organisations: 
• The formation of a ‘coalition of social movements’ to oversee the protection of 
political and socio-economic rights should be actively pursued by those 
involved in the socio- economic rights’ debate. Such a coalition would have to 
monitor the extent to which people’s rights are upheld and respected during 
conflict and protest. This would require that social movements train and deploy 
‘rights’ monitors’ in volatile communities.   
• In addition, social movements should attempt to access current government 
initiatives that enhance the development of communities such as the 
Community Development Agency. Most social movements still need to find 
suitable approaches to access government resources because they are still 
largely dependent on international funding or funding from their membership.  
• Room should be made for social movements to engage one another in dialogue 
at a national level with a view to expanding and deepening their strategies. 
This would result in positive spin-offs such as increased community cohesion 
and alternative policy development.  
•  Community projects aimed at promoting income generation should be further 
developed since they contribute towards poverty alleviation, alternative 
survival strategies and community cohesion. Such projects should include 
community vegetable gardens, ‘Umgalelo’ (community savings clubs), 
women-in-textile clubs etc. 
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• Social movements should attempt to raise the basic life skills and literacy 
levels of ordinary members by means of enrolling them at night schools in 
their areas. Specific attention should be devoted to the empowerment of 
women since they are often worse off because of their vulnerability to poverty 
and patriarchy.  
• The knowledge base of activists on global and domestic macro-economic 
dictates should be drastically expanded and broadened through political 
schools or workshops.   
• Social movements should develop and educate their membership to partake in 
opportunities for policy formulation at all government levels. Social 
movements currently choose to react to policy only when it negatively impacts 
on the lives of citizens and are simply not trying to influence the policy 
formulation process in a principled manner.  
• Communities should be informed about the formalised structures for public 
participation and active engagement such as the police forums, development 
forums and ward committees. Social movements should participate, empower 
and democratise these structures through the development of active 
engagement strategies.  
 
6.2.3 Policy Alternatives 
  Policy alternatives regarding basic services should be informed by the following:  
• The ANC’s   GEAR strategy should admit responsibility for the country’s poor 
performance in the area of basic service delivery to the poor. It is unethical that 
water be sold to get profits at a time when thousands of black poor are unable 
to sustain life because of the direct consequence of non-access to services.  
• The provision of basic services must not ensure the profitability of the private 
sector, but ensure the sustenance of human life. It is very much apartheid-like 
to sacrifice majority interests in order to ensure the profitability of a minority. 
When deciding on basic services, private sector profitability should take 
second place to developmental thinking.   
• The costs of making basic services available to everyone are by far 
outnumbered by the socio-economic gains to the entire country. But the 
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country’s current implementation of basic services amounts to the further 
entrenchment of separate development only.   
• Ensuring the right to basic services is an important objective that the 
government will have to achieve in order to fulfil its promise of ‘a better life 
for all’. Policy formulation is executed on a politicised landscape and it would 
therefore be sensible that pressure of a political nature be exerted on the State 
to influence this.  
• The promotion and protection of socio-economic rights is a core function of 
the State. Profit thinking can never drive basic services’ considerations and 
should thus come second after majority interests. 
• The equitable distribution of basic services is also another important State 
function since the current poor service levels pose serious health hazards. The 
State should monitor and regulate the service level agreements that it has with 
private service providers and should specify clear deliverables and goals to 
ensure service provision to all households.  
• Policy alternatives should also look at local and international Public-Public 
Partnerships which allows for collaboration between different State 
departments within a specific country or between State departments across 
borders.  
• In England, service disconnections have been outlawed and South Africa could 
also follow a similar model. Because the South African Constitution 
acknowledges the right to water, the imposition of service cut-offs and re-
possession of property for arrears on water bills cannot be constitutional and 
should be stopped immediately.   
• To ensure the sustainability of water utilisation in South Africa, the people, 
especially women, will have to be involved in the management of water 
services. The management of water services would have to be decentralised for 
water to be managed locally. This could be successfully done by the formation 
of co-operatives, water-committees as well as water-utilisation associations.  
6.2.4 General 
• The ANC has been reluctant to consider the provision a basic social safety net, 
such as a basic income grant for those left hopeless as the government 
liberalises the economy. As government embarks on its radical reforms, the 
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poor are the worst affected and the ones who need to buy most into the 
reforms.  
• The current welfare system covers no one between the ages of fourteen and 
sixty-five though there are plans to reduce the poverty rate only by 25 per cent. 
Trevor Manuel, the Minister of Finance, states that the country cannot afford to 
finance a culture of dependency or entitlement, to which Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu responds that one can hardly speak of entitlement when a minority 
becomes disproportionately rich through black economic empowerment. 
• The government needs to urgently provide interim social security for those 
waiting for the benefits of the economic growth to ‘trickle down’ to them. 
Even if the robust economic growth finally arrives, it is unlikely to 
significantly narrow the gap between the rich and the poor. If government does 
not provide a social safety net, its market orientated reforms will run up against 
a wall of dissatisfaction. 
• The government’s current premise is that growth must be achieved before 
redistribution is misdirected but the two should be pursued in tandem. 
Government’s anti-poverty programmes remain disjointed and uncoordinated 
and this has to change. 
• It is clear that the country will be unable to deal with poverty and 
unemployment overnight. According to some estimates, 45 percent of the 
population lives in poverty. 
• Even if the South African economy reaches the six percent growth rate and the 
spurt of investment needed, there will remain the issue of the large 
unemployed sector with no or inadequate skills for a modern economy. 
• So far, the economic costs of South Africa’s transition have fallen 
disproportionately on those it was supposed to benefit most – the millions of 
black poor. Clearly, even if growth and investment rise rapidly, it is unlikely to 
‘trickle down’ to them immediately. What is urgently needed is a welfare net 
to soften the blow, coupled with an elaborate re-skilling programme that 
begins with basic literacy and public works, and the transfer of land and skills 
in the rural areas.  
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